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 This thesis attempts to analyse and evaluate several interpretations of the Confucian 
Analects under the light of Gadamerian hermeneutics. In chapter 1, I explicate Gadamerian 
hermeneutics and analyse Gadamer’s hermeneutical view. In chapter 2, I introduce a challenge to 
Gadamer’s theory regarding the problem of objectivity, give Gadamer a limited defence, and 
then reconstruct Gadamerian hermeneutics in order to answer the challenge. Chapter 3 deals with 
some further concerns about the application of Gadamerian hermeneutics in terms of evaluating 
interpretations. Chapter 4 and 5 are spent on analysing two groups of interpretations of the 
Confucian Analects as well as the interpreters’ hermeneutical views. The first group consists of 
Zhu Xi, a scholar in the Song dynasty. The second group consists of three Qing scholars – Mao 
Qiling, Gu Yanwu, Liu Baonan – and three English-speaking translators – Roger Ames, Edward 
Slingerland, and Robert Eno. Conclusive evaluations of the two groups of interpretations are 





Gadamer on the nature of understanding 
 
I did not intend to produce an art or technique of understanding, in the manner of the 
earlier hermeneutics…nor was it my aim to… put my findings in practical ends… 
my real concerns was and is philosophic: not what we do or what we ought to do, but 
what happens to us over and above our wanting and doing.1 
 
 By this piece of paragraph quoted from the preface of Truth and Method, it is fair to say 
that Hans-Georg Gadamer does not view his hermeneutical theory as a normative procedure for 
understandings. For Gadamer, though understanding is an activity of seeking what is true (of the 
interpreted object), the truth is not hidden behind any object (such as a text or an artwork), 
waiting to be unfolded. Instead, the truth is constantly being forged through a process of 
understanding which necessarily happens. He also holds that understanding is bound with 
interpretation because understanding is fundamentally linguistic, meaning that to understand is to 
articulate the understood meaning into linguistic forms, and such an activity is essentially 
interpretative. Since every interpretation must be created by an interpreter, the truth of what is 
being interpreted can only be created by the interpreter with her participation in the process of 
understanding.2  
 In terms of textual hermeneutics, such an argument about understanding denies the pre-
existing of meaning in the text as absolute. Meaning becomes relational and it even varies along 
the process of one’s understanding. Hence, to account what the nature of understanding is for 
Gadamer, we are not looking for where the meaning as “the truth” is located nor how we can 







which Gadamer describes. I will single out, in the following sections, some essential concepts 
constituting the process of understanding in Gadamerian hermeneutics to help figuring out the 
large picture. 
 
Prejudgement and perception of completion 
In part 2 of his book, Gadamer introduces a Heideggerian conception of the fore-structure  
of understanding, the historicity, which fundamentally makes it possible for one to understanding 
anything. He asserts that one can only understand the present through the conceptions generated 
from one’s past experience, and the historicity is the finitude of this past experience. According 
to Gadamer, one’s past experience cannot be divided into individual facts but is rather like a 
stream where one is immersed in. Such a holistic definition of experience indicates that the 
finitude of a person due to her experience – her historicity – is inescapable for the person and her 
historicity cannot be bracketed or avoided partly by the person’s will. One’s historicity functions 
in one’s usage of language in all the interpretations one makes of other objects, as well as in all 
the objects one creates which are interpretable by others.3 According to Heidegger, every 
interpretation of something (i.e. to give account for something using what is different from the 
original) is based upon the interpreter’s fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. These three 
elements make up of the interpreter’s fore-structure of understanding, and the activity of 
understanding (and interpretation) is a process, beginning with this fore-structure, towards a 
future creation.4 The fore-structure provides one with certain prejudgements in understanding 







hermeneutics, the interpreter’s history has been often portrayed under a negative light, since 
something like an interpreter’s pre-understanding has been regarded to cause invalid prejudices 
which would misdirect the understanding. From Gadamer’s view, the fore-structure of an 
interpreter should be considered to be a positive factor, instead of something to avoid, for the 
interpreter’s creativity and productivity, providing the interpreter a foothold with a special 
horizon which enables her to potentially grasp everything she is capable of viewing: “What is 
true of fore-meanings that stem from usage, however, is equally true of the fore-meanings 
concerning content with which we read texts, and which make up our fore-understanding.”56 
 Let us take an example of a hermeneutic situation in textual understanding. Suppose a 
native English speaker who learns Chinese is reading a text on li (礼, usually translated to 
“ritual”) written in classical Chinese. She must come with some prejudgements – judgements 
prior to judgements about the meaning of the text – to start the process. It could be the 
knowledge of what this text is likely to talk about or the knowledge of some Chinese terms. Let 
us suppose our interpreter knows from somewhere that this text is about li, then the interpreter 
would be able to have some expectation of what may be discussed in the text (e.g. he may think 
of things like dress code or hospitality). As the reading goes, she suddenly encounters a 
paragraph on the behaviour of bei bi (卑鄙). She recalls a memory of her taking mandarin class 
in the college and finds in it that bei bi was in his vocabulary list, matching an English word 
“despicable”. Based on her general understanding of the paragraph, she senses that the behaviour 
of bei bi is depicted in a positive tone. A question is then raised by her: why and in what way can 






sceptical of this paragraph, she chooses to go on reading while holding the question in mind. As 
she has read more of the paragraph, she starts to notice that, rather than justifying the behaviour 
of despicableness to be ritually respectful, the paragraph seems to be discussing a behaviour 
different from one of despicableness: The word bei bi in this paragraph actually indicates an 
attitude of humbleness and politeness as if being a servant who is menial to others. Such a 
meaning derives from a different aspect of bei bi’s constitution, where bei (卑, usually means 
“petty” or “small”) and bi (鄙, usually means “low”) indicate a positive sense of self-
deprecating. 
 In this hermeneutic situation, our interpreter’s fore-understanding forms several 
prejudgements of hers, including her expectation of the text on talking about ritual in a sense 
identical or very similar to her own notion of ritual, which turned out to be coherent with the 
text. What those prejudgements also include is the judgement of bei bi meaning “despicable”, 
which turned out to be an illegitimate prejudgement which she later found incoherent with the 
text, and the illegitimacy was eventually realised and corrected by the interpreter herself.  
We should notice that our interpreter has experienced a step where he feels sceptical of 
the paragraph because, holding her prejudgement of bei bi meaning “despicable”, she found it 
challengeable that the paragraph claims bei bi to be ritually respectful in a positive tone. 
Nonetheless, she did not stop to criticise the text to be wrong immediately. Instead, she kept on 
reading the text and finally discovered the illegitimacy in his prejudgement. This is a rather 
important movement in the process of understanding that our interpreter assumes a “fore-
conception of completeness”7. Although our interpreter finds some ideas in the text conflict with 





expression of a complete idea. Gadamer calls such an assumption “an axiom of all 
hermeneutics”8, arguing that only through such an initial assumption can one possibly learn from 
the others. When an interpreter encounters something seeming to cause a challenge to her past 
historicity or an inconsistency in the text, the fore-conception of completeness makes her attempt 
to look for another interpretation from the text itself which allows her interpretation of this 
challenging bit to be coherent with the general interpretation of the whole text. If she does not 
presuppose this “axiom”, she would not be conscious of the inadequacy in her prejudgement nor 
start to question those prejudgements, therefore the text would just seem incoherent and 
unreasonable to her.9 
If prejudgement provides the foothold which the interpreter can rely on to grasp anything 
she is capable of viewing from it, the assumption of perception of completion insures the 
possibility for the interpreter to adjudicate whatever is given by the prejudgement. According to 
Gadamer, the perception of completion entails a “good will” held by the interpreter to “friendly 
question” the other (the author of the text, in terms of textual understanding), listen to the other, 
and learn from the other. The good will is the inherent interest in understanding the text and 
should be regarded as the virtue of understanding. With such a good will, one has his 
prejudgements open for critique, willing to accept something which seems to be against him.10 
While prejudgement serves as a necessary condition for switching on an understanding, the 











Fusing of horizons 
 Since the perception of completion has made the interpreter’s fore-structure open to 
critiques and questions, we can say that the pre-structure is not a close system. What is true for 
an interpreter’s fore-structure – her historicity – is one of the interpreter’s experience, which has 
an openness to new experience. In the introduction of Truth and Method, Gadamer writes: “the 
way that we experience one another…constitutes a truly hermeneutic universe, in which we are 
not imprisoned, as if behind insurmountable barriers, but to which we are opened.”11 
“Experience” in a Gadamerian sense, as mentioned earlier, should not be considered as a 
collection of one’s preserved informational knowledge that is dividable, but a holistic, “largely 
nonobjectifiable12 accumulation of ‘understanding’ (which we may often call wisdom).”13 
Because of its openness, the experience is able to interact with what is external to it and the 
interaction can cause the experience to be expanded in some way. Gadamer, inspired by Hegel, 
asserts the expansion of experience to be fundamentally dialectical: the expansion of experience 
has a structure of reversal or reconstructing of awareness. The expansion begins with an 
encounter with what is object to the experience; and as the person maturates her view on the 
object, treating the object as something other than merely what she should directly reject, her 
experience is itself converted so that it allows her to know the object differently from before. 
Through encountering a negativity (what is object to the experience) and a self-reconstruction 









another way so that one need not reject it) is the experience expanded. The expansion is 
obviously not a process of simply adding new conceptual terms into the experience.14 The 
expansion is better regarded as an evolution of the historicity – entailing that the finitude of one’s 
experience has been evolved to be coherent with what used to be excluded by previous finitude – 
which enables the person to view what has been first treated as negativity more adequately. It is 
neither the case where the negativity is essentially not object to the unexpanded experience, nor 
that the experience is deliberately converted in order to adapt the negativity, but that the 
negativity is discovered to be coherent with one’s understanding by his evolved historicity. 
 We have seen that one’s fore-structure of understanding is “expandable”, so it is fair to 
claim that the horizon forged by the fore-structure should therefore be open and expandable. The 
task of an interpreter, then, is to expand her own historicity, mingling the horizon from her fore-
structure with another horizon from the fore-structure of what is to be interpreted. The fusing of 
the two horizons, if we see it as a dialectical process from the view of the interpreter’s 
experience, should be not only diachronic but also synchronic. In such a fusing process, the 
history and the present, the object and the subject, the self and the other make up a unified 
whole.15 The criterion set by Gadamer for a good fusing process is that it “must be on guard 
against arbitrary fancies and the limitations imposed by imperceptible habits of thought.”16 In 
other words, only in the case where the understanding process is not dominated merely by the 
interpreter’s horizon but directed by both the text and the interpreter can such a fusing process 
take place. It is also fair to say, on the other hand, the interpreter faces the challenge of 








fore-meanings in her fore-structure and her prejudices. This challenge should never be regarded 
as being towards an extinction of one’s historicity, nor of a deliberate neutrality between the two 
horizons. We must remark that an interpreter’s prejudice, produced by her historicity, does not 
necessarily play a negative role nor certainly lead to false judgements but instead, provides the 
interpreter with a primary standpoint for understanding and the interest to continue the 
understanding. Such a prejudice is in essence judgeable for the interpreter to have either a 
positive or a negative value in an understanding. 
 The fusing of horizon requires the adjudication of prejudgements. Based on the pre-
structure of understanding and assuming the perception of completion, the interpreter projects a 
horizon of meaning for the text. This horizon, originated from the general history of the 
interpreter, exists exclusively for the text and in contradistinction to the original horizon from the 
interpreter’s historicity. Namely, the projected horizon only contains all prejudgements the 
interpreter would have about the text and those prejudgements are put into question whenever 
they are regarded in the understanding of the text. The regarded prejudgements are adjudicated to 
be either applicable or illegal in terms of understanding the text. Recall the example earlier, 
when our interpreter understands a paragraph of the text to be arguing for proper rituals in 
family, her prejudgement of the text talking about ritual is regarded and put into question. She 
finds that she does understand the argument as something related to what she regards as “ritual” 
according to her experience, so there is nothing opposing her prejudgement. In this case, a 
prejudgement is adjudicated to be applicable. However, when the interpreter sees bei bi and her 
prejudgement that this term consisting of the two scripts means “despicable” is called into 
question, she finds her understanding of the paragraph where bei bi is depicted positively, which 
opposes to her experience, namely a despicable behaviour is not often depicted in a positive tone. 
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In such a case, Gadamer insists that the meaning of this subject matter can be known “only when 
the counterinstances are dissolved, only when the counterarguments are seen to be incorrect.”17 
Only if the interpreter seeks to learn from the subject matter and tries to find the possibility in 
which the subject matter is coherent with her general understanding of the text, rather than 
blindly defends her own position drawn from past historicity, can the true meaning emerge. 
During this adjudication, “a new prejudgment that was initially not held by either of the 
conversation partners (in our case, the text author and the interpreter) could come into the 
discussion”18. This meaning serves as one aspect of the subject matter, even though it can differ 
from both the interpreter’s original prejudgement and the text author’s prejudgement about the 
subject matter. As the emerged meaning of the subject matter has been legitimised (i.e. to be 
coherent with the interpreter’s general understanding of the text), the adjudication has been 
completed, and the new prejudgement about the subject matter becomes the judgement of it.19 
 Notice that the new prejudgement forged by the evolved historicity of the interpreter is 
essentially distinct from a grasp of some kind of informational knowledge. We must not regard 
the evolution of historicity as a process of adding information to a finite domain so that the 
domain contains more elements. This is a rather important point that understanding from the 
fusing of horizons rejects the idea of understanding being an epistemological activity to “see 
more clearly” or “discover” a meaning pre-existed in the text.20 The fusing of horizons itself 
signifies an evolutionary process of the interpreter’s historicity and all understandings forged 
during the process are the interpreter’s self-consciousness and self-reconstruction, realised by the 








experience, though being finite due to one’s historicity, is not a close domain nor a set of 
objectifiable elements, the evolution of one’s historicity through reconstruction must be 
considered in the way that one’s experience as wisdom is converted as a whole. 
  
Effective history and its implications 
To Gadamer, the event that the meaning of a text emerges from an understanding process 
is in its essence an event of “effective history” (or “a fusion of horizons”21). The “effect” here 
implies the interaction between consciousness and historicity. Understanding happens constantly 
as the interpreter is conscious of her historicity and realises the evolution of her historicity. We 
have known that meaning is forged from the fusing of horizon, which belongs to neither the past 
historicity of the interpreter nor the historicity of the author. Understanding is never an action on 
an “object” by a subject, but rather a process where the interpreter works on her historicity 
within the horizon brought by the text, to be conscious of and to judge her own prejudgements. 
Once the prejudgements are adjudicated and the historicity is evolved, the interpreter and the text 
come to an agreement. Once they come to an agreement, the interpreter has had in mind the 
answer to the question she cares about in the text. 
Gadamer argues that every understanding is historical. This is to say: every interpretation 
is a way of existence of what is interpreted. A person exists as a historical being, with her own 
historical particularity and finitudes. Understanding does not symbolise one’s overcoming all her 
historical finitude but is based upon her consciousness of it and good judgement about it. Every 








future. This nature of horizon applies to not only all horizons belonging to an interpreter but also 
all horizons fused in an understanding. A meaning, though counted as a product of an 
understanding, should not be considered as the end of the understanding and it must be open to 
future understanding. Gadamer spent one third of his book Truth and Method discussing the 
understanding in arts: if a work of art is not understood historically but rather as being absolute, 
then it can by no possibility be understood by anyone. What is interpreted should always be 
treated as a historical subject instead of an inert object, and the whole understanding process is 
an event between two subjects where the interpreter constantly learns from what is interpreted 
through the fusing of horizon and brings about whatever is meaningful to the interpreter at the 
moment. 
One of the most remarkable features of Gadamerian hermeneutics is its emphasis on the 
limitation of historicity, which is drawn from Gadamer’s anti-methodological approach to 
answering the question that every hermeneutic theory must face: what is understanding? 
Gadamer not only rejects the assumption that there must be methodologies leading one to grasp 
the meaning of a text, but also rejects the assumption that the meaning of a text is absolute and 
history-free. The meaning of a text is not the end of the understanding process, so it cannot be 
absolute; the meaning is forged from the fusing of horizons, which is a historical process, so the 
meaning must be historical. For Gadamer, earlier hermeneutics all have the misassumption that 
there must be a path connecting an interpreter with the absolute meaning of a text, and a 
hermeneutic theory should sweep away the dust along the path as well as uncover the law of 
correct understanding. The absolute meaning treated as inert objects by earlier hermeneutics is 
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just an illusion formed by the false assumption, and the meaning of a text always has its 
contemporary meaningfulness to the interpreter instead of something historically eternal.22  
It might be helpful to bring in the concept of “the hermeneutic circle” for better 
understanding Gadamer’s approach. First raised by a philologist – Friedrich Ast, the principle of 
the hermeneutic circle is the circulating nature of interpretation: “the whole is, of course, 
understood in reference to the individual, so too, the individual can only be understood in 
reference to the whole”23. I think it is fair to consider Ast’s circle to be a closed circular flow 
within an experience (presupposing the interpreter’s experience as a “closed whole”), where the 
interpreter understands both the whole and the individuals completely by his own past 
experience. Gadamer would certainly disagree with such an idea, therefore he gives a new 
explication of this circle: the circle should be regarded as equal the horizon of the text, as argued 
earlier, which must be historically expandable. Every time when the interpreter tries to 
understand a text, she should have both a feeling of familiarity and a feeling of unfamiliarity. 
The familiarity derives from her fore-understanding of the text and the cultural-historical 
continuity between the interpreter’s time and the text creation’s time; while the unfamiliarity 
derives from the difference between the past experience of the interpreter and the exclusive 
historical background of the text creation. It is impossible for the interpreter to leave her past 
experience completely and enter the experience of the text creation, nor is it necessary. The 
meaning of a text, being interpreted, always goes beyond the experience of its author, as 
something born from its author’s meaning but carries a meaningfulness to the interpreter’s 








experience and therefore all forged meanings are limited by the possibility of the interpreter’s 
experiential expansion. In the other aspect, the meaning of a text is not limited to the 
meaningfulness to the time of its creation, but open to the possibility in fusing processes with 
different interpreters’ horizons.  
Such a view of understanding is shared by Charles Taylor. In his article “Interpretation 
and the Science of Man,” Taylor categorises textual understanding to the field of “science of 
interpretation”24 and to understand a text is to make sense of it in a way different from how it is 
originally expressed. “Even if there is an important sense in which a meaning re-expressed in a 
new medium cannot be declared identical, this by no means entails that we can give no sense to 
the project of expressing a meaning in a new way.”25 The meaning in understanding, for Taylor, 
is a sense for a subject, corresponding to the Gadamer’s idea that the meaning of a text must be 
meaningful to a subject (an interpreter) at a time. Understanding, then, is the process of forging 
the meaningfulness by the interpreter for herself and for others who share the same experience 
with the interpreter. 
Finally, I would like to briefly touch on the notion of “truth” in Gadamerian hermeneutics 
which could be implied by Gadamer’s view of understanding. We have seen that, in some sense, 
understanding is defined by Gadamer in terms of an interpreter’s approaching process to the text, 
which begins with the interpreter’s prejudgements of the text. A text always has content which is 
indeterminate, and the purpose of interpretation is to make more sense of what has been 
indeterminate (therefore, less understandable). In other words, an interpretation must aim at 
expressing what is true of a text’s content which has been indeterminate. The truth of 






determined by how an interpreter’s understanding process brings meaningfulness (viz. makes 
sense of the text) to the interpreter. If this is the case, a question may be raised: can one, in any 
case, claim what is determined by how one interprets a text to be true of the text? In the 
following two chapters, we will look at several challenges to Gadamerian hermeneutics 







The problem of objectivity in Gadamerian hermeneutics 
 
Gadamerian hermeneutics, in contrast to earlier hermeneutic traditions, rejects a universal 
foundation for understanding: Hans-Georg Gadamer emphasises the idea that all understanding 
must be based on the interpreter’s history. This feature might be the most inspiring aspect of 
Gadamerian hermeneutics, but it might also be the most problematic one, incurring numerous 
critiques regarding the lack of objectivity. Since everyone is a historical being – everyone is 
limited by the finitude of one’s cultural history – and one’s understanding is historically situated, 
suspicions are raised about how the meaning forged through a historically-based process can be 
vindicated as truth. It seems to be the case that, on the one hand, Gadamer insists that an 
understanding is essentially an effective history which expresses an interpreter’s consciousness 
of her general historical experience. Understanding, as a process, must take its first step from the 
interpreter’s prejudices, which reflect the interpreter’s historical experience as well as creates 
questions that the interpreter wants to find an answer for within the text being interpreted. The 
understanding process always takes the form of a dialogue and there can be no part of the whole 
process dissociated from the interpreter’s history and experience because the interpreter herself 
participates in the dialogue. Gadamer thus regards it inadequate to look for necessary and 
sufficient conditions for understanding that do not presuppose the interpreter’s situated history. 
On the other hand, Gadamer holds that a good understanding “must be on guard against arbitrary 
fancies and the limitations imposed by imperceptible habits of thought.”26 This seems to suggest 






how arbitrary an understanding is (the less arbitrary, the better the understanding). Hence, 
Gadamer seems to suggest some kind of transcendentality in his theory which allows the 
interpreter to transcend her own historical prejudices and make judgements about her 
prejudices.27 Is it contradictory that Gadamer has in hand both the inevitability of every 
interpreter’s historical finitude and the necessity of some kind of transcendentality in his 
hermeneutics? This chapter presents several challenges to Gadamerian hermeneutics regarding 
the problem of objectivity, which would force anyone who stands with Gadamer to face the 
tension between the two hands mentioned above. I consider two main questions: does 
Gadamerian hermeneutics imply subjectivism? Does Gadamer need to justify some kind of 
transcendentality in order to free his theory out of subjectivism? In this chapter, we will consider 
the first one. 
  
Truth without Method 
 Before we dive into the main concern, it would be good to ground the reason why such a 
concern is important for the plausibility of Gadamerian hermeneutics. The foremost cause of the 
concern is that Gadamer’s theory can be easily read as being founded on the rejection of 
transcendental philosophy and further as a subjectivist theory. Emilio Betti’s objection to 
Gadamer illustrates the anti-transcendental aspect in Gadamerian hermeneutics.  
 Betti, together with E. D. Hirsch, argues for a return to pre-Gadamerian hermeneutic 
tradition. Betti protests that: first, Gadamer’s theory does not do the job that should be central to 
a hermeneutical theory – offering a methodology for understanding in humane studies; second, 






first critique in fact helps to further clarify Gadamer’s position, and we will pick up the second 
critique in the next chapter. For Betti, the interpretive object has its objectivity as a certain form 
of the creator’s spirit (i.e. the objectivity of a written text would be the author’s spirit, and the 
text is a linguistic form of the spirit) and this spirit is exactly what every interpreter should strive 
to uncover. He believes that it is possible for one to accomplish an objectively valid 
interpretation by reexperiencing the object creator’s life experience.28 Betti seeks help from 
Dilthey in arguing for the possibility that an interpreter can leave her own life experience and 
enter another person’s life experience through an object the other person has created for 
interpreters to understand.29 If this possibility is vindicated, then an interpretation can be made 
indisputable in every case in which an interpreter successfully enters the object creator’s life 
experience. 
 However, this possibility is denied by Gadamer. According to Gadamer, Betti’s “valid 
interpretation” requires the interpreter to be transferred into a foreign subjectivity which divorces 
the interpreter from her own history and experience – the subjectivity of the creator of the object 
– and inverts the creating process to seek for the original idea of the creator30. Such a transition 
requires the interpreter to abandon all of her historical experience, which is impossible for a 
person, a being who is historical. To make the claim even stronger, Gadamer regards “the 
purpose to reach the object creator’s spirit in understanding” to be not just unachievable but also, 
more importantly, wrong. Gadamer holds that all understanding must be purposeful, starting 
from some point in the interpreter’s pre-structure of understanding and aiming at the interpreter’s 








inherently precludes what does not belong to the interpreter’s hermeneutical purpose, and 
therefore eliminates the requirement of a reconstruction of the object creator’s full intention. All 
that matters in an understanding should be only what the interpreter cares about. Palmer writes in 
his commentary on Gadamer: “integration, not restoration, is the true task of hermeneutics… 
such an approach would see the text [the object] in the light of the present [the interpreter’s own 
world].”31 
 From what we have seen, Gadamerian hermeneutics should certainly not be regarded as a 
doctrine of method which can provide a necessary and sufficient condition for “one correct 
understanding.” This fact leads many readers of Gadamer to think that Gadamer stands with 
subjectivism and against the tradition of transcendental philosophy32, because he seems to deny 
the possibility of one same a priori structure which enables us to “understand.” However, 
Gadamer himself has rejected this conclusion. By the anti-method point, what Gadamer refuses 
is the idea that a hermeneutical theory can be reduced to a scientific theory which bases 
psychic transposition as the special ‘method’ of the human sciences. This would 
make historical hermeneutics a branch of psychology (which was what Dilthey had 
in mind). In fact, however, the coordination of all knowing activity with what is 
known is not based on the fact that they have the same mode of being but draws its 
significance from the particular nature of the mode of being that is common to them. 
It consists in the fact that neither the knower nor the known is ‘present-at-hand’ in an 
‘ontic’ way, but in a historical one.33  
 
 
Although Gadamer denies a common “mode of coordination of all knowing activity with what is 
known”, he insists that some coordination must exist, and must exist only in a way that is 








theory of understanding is claimed, by Gadamer in the preface of the second version Truth and 
Method, to have a universal scope that reveals what necessarily happens over and over again to 
us whenever we are understanding something.34 This is often regarded as a turn into, using 
Gadamer’s own words, philosophical hermeneutics. But if Gadamer claims the universality, he 
would find his theory in a potential contradiction: he cannot argue for the universal scope of his 
hermeneutics and meanwhile lack a transcendental dimension in his theory. In other words, since 
Gadamer emphasises that his hermeneutics is not merely a pragmatic method that one can choose 
to take up in an understanding but what beyond our preference and always happen to us (i.e. the 
historically based “coordination” is an inevitable demand on each interpreter), he must 
acknowledge that his hermeneutics includes a transcendental dimension of understanding. If such 
a transcendentality were denied, then Gadamer’s claim of universality would fail, and it would 
be possible for one to skip the dialogue with a text and instead, interpret the text wholly relying 
on past experience, and still declare that one has understood the text.35  
 Clearly, Gadamer would not want to argue for objectivity in the sense of natural science, 
for otherwise his hermeneutics would run counter to its main position. Now there comes the 
difficulty, which concerns how Gadamer can be defended against subjectivism as well as 
distinguished from a universally-shared structure that can be uncovered. By realising the 
importance of both aspects – namely anti-traditional-transcendentality and required minimal 









 To illustrate the point above, it would be good to introduce an example of an 
interpretation of Gadamer which radicalises the anti-transcendental aspect. Gianni Vattimo, an 
Italian philosopher, articulates Gadamerian hermeneutics as having no transcendental implication 
and is fundamentally against any form of transcendental philosophy. Standing at a Nietzschean 
historicist position, Vattimo claims that Gadamer’s theory itself is a historical truth, instead of 
just a theory about the historicity of truth:  
 If hermeneutics, as the philosophical theory of the interpretative character of every 
experience of truth, is lucid about itself as no more than an interpretation, will it not 
find itself inevitably caught up in the nihilistic logic of Nietzsche’s hermeneutics? 
This “logic” may be encapsulated in the statement that there can be no recognition of 
the essentially interpretative character of the experience of the true without the death 
of God and without the fabling of the world or, which amounts to the same thing, of 
Being. In short, it seems impossible to prove the truth of hermeneutics other than by 
presenting it as the response to a history of Being interpreted as the occurrence of 
nihilism.36 
  
The point Vattimo makes is that a hermeneutical theory must regard itself as a historical truth 
which is born from the historicity of the hermeneutist, and this point applies to all hermeneutical 
trends including Gadamer’s. Since a hermeneutical theory is merely historical (i.e. it is merely an 
interpretation by the hermeneutist), there can be nothing non-subjective at all. For Vattimo, 
Gadamerian hermeneutics has its essential value in rejecting transcendental philosophy and he 
sees it as being nihilistic.  
If one reads Gadamer as Vattimo does, meaning would amount to nothing more than an 
interpretation of the interpreter’s own tradition. Gadamerian hermeneutics would be subject to a 
position like Nietzschean historicism, which, according to Vattimo, means to establish “a 






more plausible alternative.”37 According to this view, there can be no claim of truth other than 
the consciousness of one’s historicity. An interpretation is merely a “necessary illusion” 
provided by the interpreter’s only foundation: her historical prejudices. Hermeneutics, in order to 
avoid being a metaphysics, “can therefore not offer any conclusive evidence for its world-view, 
but only ‘present itself as the most persuasive philosophical interpretation of a situation or 
“epoch” of the course of events of which it feels itself to be the outcome’.38”39 The “Truth of 
understanding” in Gadamerian hermeneutics, although distinguished from the notion of truth as 
correspondence in a natural-scientific model under such a reading, loses the value of “being 
true,” because when all interpretations are merely necessary products of the interpreter’s only 
foundation, there can be no truth or falsity in the interpretations – the interpretation is trapped in 
the interpreter’s past experience as a closed domain.40 In such a case, not only can there be no 
criterion to judge the truth and falsity of an interpretation from outside the interpreter’s historical 
experience, but also no possibility for the interpreter herself to be critical of her own 
interpretation, entailing that there is no falsity or misunderstanding, but only the “necessary 
interpretation” that one is able to make given her tradition. The idea of “fusing of horizons” is 
then denied, because there is only one horizon, and the process of understanding becomes an 
unfolding of nihilism.  
 
The Habermas-Gadamer debate  
 There was a famous debate which took place in the 20th century in which Habermas 








argue in this section that: 1) this debate directly points to the need of some kind of norm which 
makes it possible for an interpretation to be right and wrong and 2) the debate is reconcilable, 
while the reconciliation should at least make it possible that the interpreter can take a critical 
stance towards her own history and past interpretation.  
We have found that Gadamerian hermeneutics criticises a natural-scientific model of 
hermeneutical theories and underlines the ineliminable subject-participation in all understanding. 
On this level, Habermas stands with Gadamer by arguing against those who advocate an 
emulation of the natural-scientific model in humanistic areas of study. In his book On the Logic 
of Social Sciences, Habermas accuses several approaches of falling into an idolatry of history-
free objectivity which contravenes the nature of social sciences.41 Like Gadamer, Habermas 
holds the view that social science cannot claim a purely-objective viewpoint free from any 
human history, stressing that the observer’s history must be taken into account when making 
claims about problems in humanities.42 Nevertheless, Habermas criticises Gadamer’s theory for 
failing to reveal anything potentially problematic about the interpreter’s history due to its lack of 
a normative methodology. 
 Clearly, Gadamer has in mind to free hermeneutics from “the prejudice against 
prejudice” held by scientistic hermeneutic theorists. Habermas thinks that such an aim has not 
only made Gadamer criticise the a natural-scientific model for hermeneutics, but also avoid 
providing methodological prescriptions. According to Habermas, although Gadamer is right to 
resist a natural-scientific model in interpretation, he has mistakenly and abstractly opposed 








a principle of methodology. Despite the fact that a natural-scientific model of methodology is not 
a suitable model for human science, it is wrong to exclude all methodological elements in 
hermeneutics. The radical exclusion of methodology implies a lack of normativity, and the lack 
of normativity eventually eliminates the possibility that one can be critical of one’s own tradition 
(historicity, in Gadamer’s word). Recall that Gadamer argues for the universality of his 
hermeneutic theory and refuses to attribute his theory to a methodology because he thinks that all 
methodological theories of understanding have a scientific model. In Habermas’ view, a 
methodological theory does not presuppose a scientific model, meanwhile, however, a 
methodology can offer a normativity which one can refer to so that one can be right or wrong 
when applying the theory. In terms of history-based understanding, one needs the normativity to 
judge one’s own history (tradition). For this reason, Habermas emphasises a need for a reflective 
appropriation of tradition that allows one to question one’s own tradition, which he thinks 
Gadamer fails to allow. Without “the power of reflection”, what is problematic about one’s 
historical structure of understanding can never be revealed but instead be granted as a given. In 
Habermas’s work The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality, he uses an analogy of psychological 
distortion to illustrate this defect: someone with psychological distortion cannot discover the 
pathology without an external reference, usually the help of a psychotherapist.43 For Habermas, 
any interpreter under Gadamer’s theory could be one with, at least latent, psychological 
distortion. Therefore, he calls for “a system of reference that transcends the context of tradition 
as such. Only then can tradition be criticized as well.”44 This system of reference demands a 







appropriations. Namely, the system of reference must be referable at any time when one applies 
a prejudgement to the understanding. Only with such references is one able to make reflections, 
which Habermas regards to be necessary in any hermeneutical theory. 
 Reflection, for Habermas, is the ability to reason. Such an ability makes one’s tradition 
accessible to judgement and critique by oneself. We might recall the adjudication of 
prejudgement in Gadamer’s theory which takes the interpreter to the “fusing of horizons”. A 
good “fusing of horizons” requires the interpreter to be conscious of her own prejudgements 
while put them into question. Is this what Habermas is seeking with his concern about reflection? 
Did Habermas simply overlook this aspect of Gadamer’s book? According to Mandelson, the 
debate between these two took place due to their attitude towards the idea of adjudicating one’s 
prejudgement, namely the “system of reference” that Habermas calls for. Gadamer sees the 
“system of reference” as a turn to rationalism which he has been criticising throughout his book. 
To Gadamer, the idea of reflection requires one to judge the historical structure of one’s 
understanding from outside one’s history, which would violate his argument that one can never 
bring one’s historical structure into transparency. While to Habermas, the call for reflection may 
not have such a radical implication. As the ability of reasoning, reflection does not have to deny 
its bond with historicity and it is certainly incapable of bringing the historical structure into pure-
transparency. Mandelson suggests that Habermas might clarify his point by distinguishing “those 
inevitable preunderstandings which derive simply from one’s participation in culture, and those 
false preconceptions which are anchored in systematically distorted forms of 
communication…its normative ideal is the complete elimination of systematic blockages to 
communication with oneself or others. But it certainly does not claim to being to consciousness 
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all of the addressee’s preconceptions – an impossible task.”45 What Habermas’ critical theory 
stresses is not a rationalist reference external to one’s history but an intention to reach a 
maximum of shared pre-structure of understanding between the interpreter and the interpreted so 
that “a certain degree of control” can be achieved.46 In other words, the system of reference that 
Habermas calls for is a possibility that the interpreter can verify whether her own tradition as the 
pre-structure of understanding is adequate or not for interpreting whatever she tries to interpret, 
which is equally what makes Gadamer’s “fusion of horizons” accomplishable.  
 The task Gadamer faces, originally for the purpose of further justifying his hermeneutics, 
may be exactly the same task of giving “the reflection” Habermas calls for. The reflection must 
offer a level of normativity to draw the line between hermeneutics and some kind of relativistic, 
arbitrary story telling. At the same time, the reflection should not go beyond the boundary of 
one’s historicity so that the primary stance of Gadamer’s theory is preserved. 
 
Reconciliation through reconstructing the theory 
We may find hope to reconcile the Habermas-Gadamer debate by reconstructing 
Gadamerian hermeneutics with the help of Sellars’ idea of “the space of reasons” (as articulated 
by John McDowell): 
For McDowell, the question is this: is transcendental philosophy necessarily 
exercised from a standpoint external to the processes whose world-disclosing ability 
is to be vindicated? … McDowell claims that transcendental philosophy can also be 








In Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Sellars states that an intentional state must be placed 
“in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says”.48 
McDowell sees it as  
means to exclude an externalist view of epistemic satisfactoriness, a view according 
to which one can be entitled to a belief without being in a position to know what 
entitles one to it. Knowing things, as Sellars intends his dictum to mean, must draw 
on capacities that belong to reason, conceived as a faculty whose exercises include 
vindicating one’s entitlement to say things.49  
 
For McDowell, the space of reasons provides a normativity to intentional states, meaning that we 
are responsible to do certain things whenever we are thinking and believing with responsiveness 
to certain norms or rules. He further states that the act of judging is the paradigmatic mode of 
actualising norms (by asserting that something is true or not according to the norms). The space 
of reasons requires one to judge, and this requirement implies a realm of the freedom of judging. 
McDowell stresses that this freedom is limited to judgements about intentional states. For 
example, we can judge the belief that “it is raining outside” by going out and check the weather, 
based on our concept of “rain”50. However, when it comes to non-intentional forms of 
intelligibility, such as a causal influence described by natural science, we cannot take such a 
critical stance – the influence is either exercised or not, and there is no right or wrong.51  
 The claim about freedom by McDowell is rather important because it draws the boundary 
of our freedom of judging, distinguishing human, as historical beings, with both a God-like being 











priori, but are formed explicitly and implicitly from the cultural history one has been immersed 
in. Through constant participation in a social-historical community, one’s language and 
experience are shaped to have its cultural features which become the norms. Notice that the 
norms themselves should not be treated as simply caused but as what has been justified 
according to earlier norms. In Mind and World, McDowell uses a Kantian idea of “spontaneity” 
in applying concepts to explain how the space of reason really works: “empirical knowledge 
results from a co-operation between receptivity and spontaneity…The power of spontaneity 
comprises a network of conceptual capacities linked by putatively rational connections, with the 
connections essentially subject to critical reflection.”52 This “expansion” of norms seems to 
parallel Gadamer’s argument for the expansion of experience, which reforms the structure of 
understanding through the fusing of new experience into the pre-structure of understanding. 
Even more similar with Gadamer, McDowell explains the process of judging in the space of 
reasons to be realised by linguistic articulation: “In being initiated into a language, a human 
being is introduced into something that already embodies putatively rational linkages between 
concepts, putatively constitutive of the layout of the space of reasons, before she comes on the 
scene.”53 Briefly speaking, it is language that realises and governs one’s norm, and the 
possibility of actualising a norm relies upon one’s ability to articulate one’s language. To 
Gadamer, as to McDowell, understanding is fundamentally linguistic, namely, to understand is to 
articulate the understood into linguistic forms.  
By arguing for the internality of the norms, McDowell denies one’s dependence on any 






when judging an intentional state through the space of reasons without being constrained by any 
external normativity: 
It is to refuse to conceive experience’s demand on a system of beliefs as imposed 
from outside the activity of adjusting the system, by something constituted 
independently of the current state of the evolving system, or a state into which the 
system might evolve. The required adjustments to the system depend on what we 
take experience to reveal to us, and we can capture that only in terms of the concepts 
and conceptions that figure in the evolving system. What we take experience to tell 
us is already part of the system, not an external constraint on it.54 
 
The rejection of normativity external to one’s cultural history is also implied by Gadamer’s 
reading of Socratic dialogues. Perhaps many of us read all Socratic dialogues written by Plato to 
be pointing at the abstract and timeless “truths” in a realm cut off from our historical world, 
which we even refer to as the “Platonic realm”. Such an idea about truth is obviously opposed to 
Gadamer’s theory. However, Gadamer reads the Ancient Greek works from a different angle 
which builds a coherency between the Greek dialogues and Gadamer’s theory, by which he 
“does not understand Platonic dialectics as a method of exposing super-sensible meaning located 
in a metaphysical realm, but rather as the practice of dialogue as paradigmatically exercised by 
Socrates… the aim is not to articulate definitive or ultimate knowledge, but to lead the reader to 
an insistence on the search for knowledge as such.”55 In other words, the “Socrates” in those 
conversations does not argue for absolute truths in a platonic realm, but rather attempts to make 
the dialogue go on so that the two dialogists can both grow a deeper understanding of the topic 
through dialectics. Gadamer and McDowell emphasise both the finitude and the freedom in one’s 






being “able to judge the full nature and extent of any norms that govern our knowledge”56, while 
the freedom, being within our cultural history, gives the possibility for one to take a critical 
stance at which one can judge one’s intentional states (aka. “tradition” by Habermas and 
“prejudgement” by Gadamer). Wachterhauser puts it this way: “freedom can be illustrated by 
pointing out a well-known relationship between how we are formed by such traditions and how 
we contribute to their development. Only if we are deeply formed by a tradition are we capable 
of modifying those traditions in meaningful ways… one can change such norms [which one 
refers to in her language and tradition] only by demonstrating a deeper grasp of them.”57 In this 
sense, the more deeply we are conscious of being formed by a tradition, the more freely and 
appropriately we can actualise norms which derive from it in the space of reasons. Returning to 
the task set by Habermas, we shall find that Habermas’ call for a system of reference is satisfied 
because the reflective stance given by freedom within the space of reasons has been vindicated 
within one’s cultural history, the “system of reference” non-independent from one’s tradition. At 
the end of Truth and Method, Gadamer claims that “what the tool of [natural-scientific] method 
does not achieve must—and really can—be achieved by a discipline of questioning and 
















The problem in the application of Gadamerian hermeneutics 
 
The reconstruction of Gadamerian hermeneutics has proved that there is an inherent 
normativity in Gadamerian hermeneutics, which is the space of reasons. However, although the 
space of reasons enables one to question and examine one’s cultural history based on the 
expandability of one’s experience, the space of reasons itself is formed by one’s historical 
experience. However, in consideration of our purpose in this project – which is to evaluate other 
people’s interpretation of a text – a kind of normativity which allows one to question and 
examine another person’s interpretation seems to be necessary. Now we should be concerned of 
this question: is there a kind of normativity given by Gadamer that enables one to transcend 
one’s general cultural history? 
 The answer to the question, I think, cannot be made straightforwardly, and the difficulty 
originates from Gadamer’s rejection of the natural-scientific model of methodology. In the 
earlier discussion, despite the sound justification of the normativity in Gadamer’s theory, the 
normativity is bound to the interpreter’s world-view. Unlike natural sciences which claim an all-
embracing view for their laws and theories, Gadamer’s theory seems insufficient to account for 
how one can judge the interpretations made from a world-view other than one’s own. 
 
Victory of scepticism? 
 Here we shall re-address the second critique raised by Betti and Hirsch: Gadamer does 
not give explicit criteria for legitimating an interpretation. In the book Validity in 
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interpretation59, Hirsch writes: “Suppose, as it often happens, two readers disagree about the 
meaning of a text…. What principle would they have for determining who is more nearly 
right?... tradition cannot really function as a stable, normative concept… Without a genuinely 
stable norm we cannot even in principle make a valid choice between two differing 
interpretations…”60 While the consequence of this concern about Gadamerian hermeneutics 
stated by Hirsch – a hermeneutic nihilism – has been denied from the interpreter’s viewpoint, we 
are left with the problem of lacking a criterion for one to judge another’s interpretation. Since 
each interpreter is finite due to her historicity, does it mean that each interpreter is blocked off 
from any truth claims of others’ in other normative traditions? If one argues for a normativity 
that is outside one’s cultural-historical community to judge an interpretation made from an alien 
viewpoint, one would fall into the position Gadamer stands against. If not, one can never find a 
fair stance to make judgement about whether an interpretation made by someone else has 
achieved the virtue of understanding via the normativity given by the space of reasons. In other 
words, one cannot discern and differentiate the arbitrary and the adequate in another’s 
interpretation, given that normative traditions are different. 
 Wachterhauser, defending Gadamer, rejects this sceptical idea. He understands the 
objection as assuming “an unbridgeable gulf of radical incommensurability”61 between different 
people’s historicities. This assumption must be false because  
there is a sense in which all traditions occupy the same normative ground, but they 
may very well occupy different pieces of it at different points in time. In this sense, 
the historicity of our traditions places a real limit on the completeness of our 









stranglehold; it places a real limit on the completeness of our knowledge, but it 
allows for real knowledge of ourselves, of others, and of the world.62  
 
Wachterhauser stresses the possibility of the commensurability between historicities, and he 
finds his backup from Gadamer’s theory about language. He uses Gadamer’s claim that one 
always understands the world in one’s own language while this “world” ought to be conceived as 
“the world” shared by all users of the same language.63 There are two further clarifications for 
this claim. First, Gadamer denies that all reality are just words. It is better to comprehend the 
claim as saying that language has made the world more intelligible to one who can use the 
language. The second clarification concerns the development of a language. Although one’s 
freedom is situated in one’s linguistic tradition, one’s language, like all languages, is extendable 
in various ways while not being fixed by a set of rules. With the help of this claim, 
Wachterhauser tries to point out that one can always extend one’s knowledge through learning 
from other people’s use of language.64 The normativity required for one’s judgement about 
someone else’s interpretation would then become identical to the normativity within one’s own 
language boundary, since one’s usage of language has been extended to include the other 



















incommensurability, but not necessarily a rejection of contingent incommensurabilities”65, 
because it is not guaranteed that one’s usage of language can be extended to fully include another 
person’s usage of language for an interpretation of something.66 If we go back to the problem of 
transcendentality, Wachterhauser’s argument might have provided the possibility for one to 
transcend one’s past history – by extending one’s usage of language to include another’s (while 
“transcend” might not be a good word for such an extension). Nevertheless, such a possibility 
faces the solipsistic challenge: merely because there is a chance for one’s extended usage of 
language to include another person’s usage does not imply that it is judgeable whether or not 
one’s usage of language has been so extended. 
Though Wachterhauser does not explicitly spell it out, I read his strategy to be that: a 
judgement about an interpretation is based on the understanding of the interpretation as a 
complete whole; therefore, a process of understanding must happen in the evaluation. Hence, on 
one hand, the evaluator enters an understanding process of the original text (the text being 
interpreted by the evaluated interpretation) from the fused horizon with the evaluated interpreter. 
On the other hand, the evaluation is itself made within the fused horizon fusing the evaluator’s 
cultural historical experience and the evaluated interpretation. In short, judging an interpretation 
is deconstructed by Wachterhauser to be simply an understanding of the original text and another 
text (the evaluated interpretation) at the same time, and the normativity of evaluation would be 
the same as the normativity of understanding, which has been vindicated by the reconstruction. 
However, this does not quite answer the concern because, in his denial of the 
incommensurability, Wachterhauser presupposes the overlapping between historicities, which is 






historical community having something in common with evaluators who use the same language. 
As he has admitted, even though there is no necessary incommensurability, there can be 
contingent incommensurability. If an evaluator sees part of an interpretation as inadequate, how 
can he tell if the inadequacy is due to the interpreter’s arbitrariness in her understanding or due to 
the incommensurability between the evaluator’s own historicity and the interpreter’s? Instead of 
an assumption of possible partial commensurability, what is really needed here might be a 
criterion for discerning whether a viewpoint is formed from an alien cultural-historical 
community. If such a criterion is not given, the veil between the evaluator’s and the interpreter’s 
cultural history can never be penetrable: since the evaluator can only make evaluations when he 
shares the same normativity of understanding with the evaluated interpreter, and the evaluator 
cannot make any judgment about an interpretation deriving from a cultural history alien to his 
own (for if so, there is no normativity for the evaluator to refer to), the criterion for discernment 
must be given so that it would be knowable whether or not certain normativity is applicable in an 
evaluation.  
Perhaps Wachterhauser has found it impossible to offer such a criterion from a 
Gadamerian stance, and for this reason, he acknowledges that “the sceptic cannot be answered, at 
least not on her own terms, because the full extent of our reliance on historically mediated 
normativity and the contingencies of language cannot be surveyed sufficiently to rule out the 
possibility of error that might result from being the unconscious dupes of our own 
indebtedness”67. However, Wachterhauser still advocates a positive attitude toward the 
Gadamerian response he gave to the concern. As he states: “the collapse of foundationalism does 






essential ideas in Gadamerian hermeneutics is to challenge the achievability of “certainty”. From 
the fact that one cannot give objectively (in the sense of natural science) sufficient evidence for 
something, it does not follow that one is wrong, especially when it is already justified that one 
can have some degree of normativity to judge herself.69 The inherent limitations of 
understanding ought not be considered an inherent inaccessibility to truth. On the contrary, what 
we have within the limitation furnishes us the possibility and condition towards the truth. 
 
Revisit the question about truth 
In order to solve the problem of objectivity in Gadamerian hermeneutics, we have looked 
for elements which are coherent with Gadamer’s theory meanwhile able to free it from 
subjectivism. From the reconstruction of the theory, a normativity is vindicated so that the 
interpreter is enabled to take a critical stance towards her own cultural history. However, such a 
normativity is justified not because it transcends the interpreter’s general cultural history, but that 
it derives from the openness of the interpreter’s experience. The normativity might be treated as 
a kind of transcendentality which enables one to transcend one’s cultural history in the past (as 
said earlier, “transcend” does not really sound like the right word), but it certainly does not take 
one out of one’s general cultural history. I suggest that we can comprehend it as the capability of 
reflection and evolution. Instead of forcibly claiming to have vindicated a transcendentality in 
Gadamer’s theory, it might be more proper to claim that the goodness we look for from 
transcendentality in order to free Gadamerian hermeneutics from subjectivism can be given by 
the capability of reflection and evolution without arguing for a transcendental dimension in 





the capability of reflection and evolution provides objectivity by giving the normativity which is 
relative to one’s general cultural history. Although, as argued in the last section, the relative 
objectivity does not guarantee to bring one all of what can be questionable from one’s cultural 
history, the openness of experience indicates that one’s way towards truth is not blocked off by 
one’s cultural history. With that said, it seems that one has been justified to have a stance of 
being critical of another person’s interpretation.  
However, what can an evaluator really judge about another’s interpretation from such a 
stance? Assuming the commensurability between cultural histories, the evaluator is able to judge 
whether an interpreter has interpreted well in a sense the interpreter has participated in the fusing 
of horizons as if the evaluator is the interpreter himself. But is it all an evaluator is expected to 
do in an evaluation? Probably not. When we think about an evaluation of an interpretation of a 
text, the evaluator usually judges the interpretation in regard to whether the interpretation says 
something true of the text, instead of whether the interpreter has been open-minded/critical 
enough in the process of understanding. This concern shall lead us back to the notion of “truth” 
in Gadamerian hermeneutics which has been mentioned in chapter 1, that whether the truth of the 
content of a text can be determined by how one interprets the text. 
In the article “Gadamer’s realism,” Wachterhauser attempts to draw a necessary relation 
between how one interprets the text and being true of the text. Wachterhauser asserts Gadamer’s 
epistemological view to be “perspectival realism,”70 because, to Gadamer, what is true of a text – 
the meaning – must be meaningful to a “historically contingent” and “linguistically mediated” 
perspective. The true meaning of a text always reveals an aspect of the text but can never bring 






where he claims that “there can be no proposition that is purely and simply true.”72 Inversely, 
Gadamer also claims that the-text-itself can never be transparent, independent from any 
perspective. The truth of a text must be linguistically presented, and linguistic presentation 
entails perspectives with limitation – the finitude of the language user’s cultural history.73 
Wachterhauser insists that such a view (what he calls “perspectival realism”) is a type of direct 
realism, by which Gadamer argues that a linguistic interpretation of a text is a direct presentation 
of the text’s content. In this sense, the process one takes to interpret a text can be “self-
authenticating” regarding being true of the text, and it offers us “a level of inexhaustible insight 
that can sustain ‘infinite’ interpretive efforts.”74 
It might be fair to claim that, according to Gadamer, every interpretation of a text must 
both conditioned and limited by the interpreter’s cultural history, and every interpretation must in 
some respects present the truth of the text. In addition, because of the potential commensurability 
between cultural histories, every interpretation, being itself open to future interpretive efforts, 
also provides those who do not share the same cultural history with inexhaustive insights towards 
the truth of the text. Of course, all of what have been argued are based upon the condition that 
the interpreter has more or less participate into the fusing of horizons. In other words, as long as 
an interpreter has entered the understanding process, there is always something true of the text 
we can find in her interpretation. The job of an evaluator, then, is to make assessment of how 











How do we evaluate? 
I shall spend this section discussing two guiding points towards the next few chapters in 
which different interpretations of the Analects will be evaluated under the light of Gadamerian 
hermeneutics: 1) what does it mean to evaluate an interpretation? 2) how can Gadamerian 
hermeneutics be applied to evaluate an interpretation? 
 Michael Scriven introduces the transdisciplinary view of evaluation in his paper “The 
Nature of Evaluation”, and I regard it as helpful to understand what we are going to do with the 
different interpretations. Scriven defines evaluation to be “a process of determining merit, worth, 
or significance… and this process may be judgemental or inferential.”75 The transdisciplinary 
view of evaluation categorises evaluation to be a transdiscipline, meaning that evaluation is itself 
an autonomous discipline while at the same time “its methods and results provide important tools 
used in a significant number of other disciplines.”76 According to this view, evaluation should be 
regarded as a tool that can be applied in multiple disciplines to make critical judgements. Like 
Scriven’s definition suggests, evaluation is usually judgemental or inferential, and being 
judgemental or inferential requires some kind of criteria. Such criteria are given by the discipline 
of the evaluation itself.77 
 Since an interpretation must be made in a particular language, at a particular time, and by 
a person who understands and explains in a particular way, we can treat the interpretation as a 
representation which corresponds a discipline of interpretation. The evaluation of interpretation, 
in such a case, is the discipline that can be applied to make judgements about all the disciplines 







understanding (a school of hermeneutics), while the evaluation, being a theory of understanding 
itself, serves to analyse the evaluated theories of interpretation and make judgments about the 
interpretations made from those theories. When a theory of understanding is used for evaluation, 
the methods and normativity offered by that theory for understanding would be the scale for 
judging the evaluated interpretations.  
 Before discussing how we can use Gadamerian hermeneutics as the trans-hermeneutics 
discipline to assess different interpretations, I shall remark on why we should apply Gadamerian 
hermeneutics rather than any other theory of understanding by reemphasising Gadamer’s 
rejection of a universal foundation for understanding. Nicolas Davey comments on Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics about what the theory appreciates: 
 understanding in the humanities is not to be articulated as problem-solving which 
when achieved brings an end to discussion, but as a process whereby we begin to 
understand the open-ended nature of certain fundamental questions more deeply.78 
 
Clearly, hermeneutics, as well as hermeneutical methods, should be regarded as a humanities 
study, distinct from natural science studies which points to “an end of discussion”. Gadamer’s 
rejection of methodology in understanding in his hermeneutics is an emphasis on the distinction 
between humanities and natural science, in order to stress that a humanities study should not be 
done in the same way natural science studies are done. 
 What really is the difference between humanities and natural science? Why does it matter 
when it comes to our evaluation of interpretations? As we have seen in the previous chapters, 
although both natural science and humanities studies use language to understand and interpret 
the world, natural science does all these by objectifying what is to be understood and interpreted 






studied in humanities share an “I and thou” relationship. In a humanities activity like 
understanding a text, the interpreter treats the text as a subject, participating into a dialectical 
activity with the text. What Gadamer rejects, however, is objectifying the text to be an object and 
anatomising the object according to a divinely-given method. If we want to evaluate an 
interpretation, we want the evaluation to be done as a humanities study. We do not want, for 
example, a theory of understanding which claims a “universal formula” for all understandings in 
all languages to be the scale, although it might be much easier to judge different interpretations 
of a same text – since such a theory would certainly claim one solely correct interpretation for 
each text, which would be the outcome of filling the text into its “universal formula” – and all 
the interpretations different from the solely correct one would simply be bad interpretations. In 
other words, the transdiscipline that we apply as the scale must itself provide what is suitable for 
a humanities study, otherwise all the work we are going to do in the following chapters would be 
based upon a fundamental mistake. Lin An Wu made an argument about the core value of 
humanities studies in one of his lectures in Taipei which resonates Gadamer’s view on 
humanities: like natural sciences, humanity studies also include empirical description and theory 
building, but humanity has its core value in neither of these two. Instead, the core of humanity 
studies should be the pursuit of ideas. If a humanity study contains only empirical description 
and theory building, it will very likely become “an accomplice with the most powerful class in 
the society [because what the study claims to be the truth of human would be claimed as the truth 
of human with transparency rather than aspectual].”79 By the pursuit of ideas, Lin means that we 






should therefore be based on each subject itself.80 If we use the methods in science, such as 
statistics, to study a subject matter in humanities, we would be quantifying the subject matter and 
applying a method which is independent from the subject matter. Likewise, argued by Charles 
Taylor, that “social reality” between “subjects” is not made up of brute data. All of what is true 
about a society must not be regarded as some kind of pre-existed reality which is independent of 
any language which are used to describe it.81 If the method is independent from the subject 
matter that we studied, the subject is not treated as a subject but an object in a group which has 
no difference with other objects in the same group, and the result from such a study would be 
meaningless. As long as we agree that hermeneutics is a humanities study, Gadamer is right in 
rejecting universal foundation for understanding. Because there is no universal foundation for 
understanding, there is no all-powerful key to the understanding of any one text, hence no all-
powerful scale for evaluating any one interpretation. 
 One might question, then, if there can be no universal standard for the evaluation of 
interpretations, can we still make objective assessments of an interpretation at all? This question 
exactly connects the problem which the previous chapter endeavours to solve with the rest of the 
project. We should have found that (the reconstructed) Gadamerian hermeneutics certainly 
allows us to make objective evaluations without providing an all-powerful key to understanding 
texts. Recall that, from the reconstruction of the theory, the capability of reflection and evolution 
are proved to provides objectivity by giving the normativity which is relational to one’s cultural 







relational objectivity given by the capability of reflection and evolution is not only sufficient to 
free Gadamerian hermeneutics from subjectivism but also applicable as a transdiscipline. 
 Now we shall look at the final question: how Gadamerian hermeneutics can be applied in 
our evaluations? In Truth and Method, Gadamer replaces method – an all-powerful formula for 
all correct understandings – with dialogues engaging the interpreter and the text. The dialogues 
take the form of question and answer, where the interpreter keeps raising questions for the text to 
answer, and understandings are satisfactory answers the interpreter gets from the text. Hence, the 
evaluator of an interpretation must first evaluate the question which the evaluated interpreter 
asks the text (i.e. the motive/interest held by the interpreter). The question an interpreter raises 
could be good or bad, based on whether the answer to that question can be well given by the text 
or not. For example, there is a sentence in the Analects: “If you study but don’t reflect, you’ll be 
lost. If you reflect but don’t study, you’ll get into trouble (学而不思则罔，思而不学则殆).”82 
An interpreter may raise different questions to this sentence. Some may ask: “what does 
Confucius mean by ‘reflect’?” Some may ask: “which would be a worse case – being lost or 
getting into trouble?” The former question could be well answered by the text, and one is very 
likely to interpret “reflect” as “introspection” or “self-judge”. The latter, however, seems to be a 
bad question for the text, since the text does not seem to imply a preference between being lost 
and getting into trouble, but instead asserts both cases to be unwanted. The answerability of the 
question that the interpreter asks the text is the minimum requirement of a good interpretation, 
because a good interpretation must first be coherent with the text so that the answer given by the 





 Cultural difference may play a tricky role when we evaluate an interpretation. Sometimes 
we simply cannot observe at the first glance how the question raised by the interpreter is 
connected to the text. It indicates that we should not assess a question to be unanswerable by the 
text merely based on our first sketch of the interpretation. The evaluator must try to discern 
whether the incoherence he has observed between the interpretation and the text is due to the 
interpreter’s unsuitable question or the difference between the evaluator’s and the interpreter’s 
cultural histories. As suggested earlier, there is no a priori incommensurability between cultural 
histories, and cultural histories are potentially commensurable through language. The evaluator 
must assure that he has shared some cultural agreement with the interpreter on the piece of 
evaluated interpretation, which implies that the evaluator must not only look at the interpretation 
but also understand the interpreter and the interpreter’s relation with the text.83 The interpreters 
we are going to see in the following chapters –Zhu Xi and post-Ming interpreters – are all those 
from cultures more or less different from mine in multiple aspects. In order for me to stand at a 
position of evaluating their interpretations of the Analects, I will first do a historical research on 
their cultural background to assure that I would be able to understand their language using and 
their interpretations of the Analects. Only then will my evaluation be legit, and my critique (if 
there is any) be adequate, for each of the interpretations. 
 Once the evaluator manages to put on the evaluated interpreter’s lenses, the evaluator is 
able to make judgements of the interpretation, and the interpretation will be assessed to be good 
or bad in certain respects by certain standards. According to the reconstructed Gadamerian 








interpretation, according to the opening nature of understanding, an interpretation should be open 
to other possibilities of understanding. A good interpretation should reveal meaningfulness from 
the text in some respects, but it should certainly not claim itself to be some kind of authoritarian 
(or the only correct) interpretation of the text. Second, an interpreter may stand at relatively more 
inferior positions of understanding a text than other interpreters do – in certain aspects – due to 
their culture history, including language, the time of their living from the text author’s writing, 
and the lack of knowledge about the text author’s history, etc. For the Analects, English 
translators may be standing at a relatively inferior position because the forms/styles of classical 
Chinese in a text sometimes do not make much sense for English speakers and there has been 
little communication in history between the English language and the language of classical 
Chinese.84 Third, a good interpretation, forged from a fusing of horizons, must reveal something 
meaningful to times other than when the interpreted text is written, entailing that a good 
interpretation should speak to the present, providing perspectives and ideas originated from the 
text that would stimulate people’s thinking about the present world. It is also implied by 
Gadamerian hermeneutics that an interpretation of something, as a creation, always has certain 
value which can be appreciated by people besides the value people could appreciate from simply 
reading the original text.  
 With those in hand, it should be clear how we will deal with the materials in the 
following chapters. The purpose for the evaluation of those interpretations is not to grade them, 
nor to rank them from “the best” to “the worst”, but to investigate how these interpreters treat the 
work of interpreting one same text differently from a hermeneutically and philosophically 






individually through investigating how those interpretations were made, judge the interpretation 
as well as the hermeneutics underlying the interpreter’s understanding critically, and bring some 






Zhu Xi and his metaphysical reading of the Analects 
 
 I shall clarify at the beginning of this evaluation that, since the purpose of this whole 
project is to examine multiple interpretations of the Confucian Analects, it is always more 
adequate to treat this evaluation as one of interpretation works (picked from many trends) on the 
Analects rather than one of different traditions of thoughts such as Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucian 
theory which we will lightly touch in this chapter. Although it will turn out that Zhu’s 
metaphysics undisputedly plays an important role in his interpretation, what we focus on ought 
to be “is what Zhu regards as the right way of understanding a good approach” instead of “is Zhu 
Xi’s Neo-Confucianism a good theory.” In the following two chapters, interpretations of pieces 
from the Analects by people from various cultural histories will be introduced and assessed. As 
said in the earlier chapter, I will first try to understand the interpreter’s use of language in a way I 
am capable of – namely trying my best to commensurate the interpreter’s cultural history with 
mine. Given such conditions, I will look at each interpretation, analyse it, and conclude about 
how understanding the Analects is like for the interpreters – viz. the interpreter’s hermeneutical 
view – so that the interpretations by that interpreter could be appreciated. After these two 
chapters, comparisons as well as critiques will be made of their hermeneutics. Finally, we shall 
discuss how these interpretations can bring meaningfulness to the present. 
 In this chapter, we will look at Zhu Xi’s (1130-1200), a literatus in the Song Dynasty 
(960-1279), interpretation of the Confucian Analects. According to the evaluation procedure, I 
shall first investigate Zhu Xi’s cultural history so that we can be relatively informed about the 




Zhu Xi and Confucian classics 
 The reading of Confucian classics in the Song Dynasty experienced a turning point in 
both the aspect of which texts are regarded to be the authoritative ones and the aspect of how the 
texts are interpreted by scholars. The former can be reflected by the comparison of the 
authoritative texts at the beginning of Song and those at the end of the dynasty: the Five Classics 
– the Book of Changes, the Book of History, the Book of Poetry, the Book of Rites, and the Spring 
and Autumn Annals – was regarded by the Confucian school as the most quintessential texts over 
all others85; while by the end of the Song, the importance of the Five Classics had been displaced 
by the Four Books – the Greater Learning, the Analects, the Mencius, and the Mean. The latter, 
on the other hand, could be observed in the exegeses made by Confucian scholars of the Song 
Dynasty that plenty of language of metaphysics is employed, which indicates a switch of 
scholarly attention in the Confucian tradition.86 
 If one is to investigate the interpretations of Confucian texts made in the Song, Zhu Xi is 
certainly the one who should never be overlooked. Zhu is not only one of the Confucian scholars 
who employed the most contemporary language of metaphysics in the interpretations of 


















 Zhu received early education from a family tutor at his young age, having learned and 
recited Confucian classics over and over again. “I started reading the Four Books since very 
young, and it was a tough experience (某自丱读四书，甚辛苦),”88 said by himself and recorded 
in “A Collection of Conversations of Master Zhu (Zhuzi Yulei)” edited by Li Jingde. After the 
age of 14, Zhu began to be taught under the school of scholars who were obsessed with Li Xue89 
and Buddhism. Such an experience lays the foundation of Zhu’s scholarship. There was onetime 
when Zhu decided to abandon Confucianism for Chan Buddhism, but he turned back to become 
a Confucian again at his 23 and acknowledged Li Tong as his master:  
某少时未有知，亦曾学禅且将圣人书来读。读来读去，一日复一日，觉得圣贤言语渐
渐有味。却回头看释氏之说，渐渐破绽，罅漏百出90 
I was ignorant in my youth and devoted to Chan Buddhism … I took a book of Confucius to 
read. After reading it again and again from day to day, I started to find Confucius’s words 
flavourful. Then I return to the Buddha’s words, finding them to be full of flaws. 
 
Among the Confucian texts, Zhu’s earliest and most attention was devoted into the 
exegesis of the Analects. He started writing commentaries on the book when he was still 
following Li Tong, studying not only the text itself but also the other exegeses made by 
predecessor interpreters such as He Yan91 (190-249) from the Wei dynasty and Xing Bing from 
the North Song. Zhu criticises those exegeses for superficially paying all their attentions to the 
“instructional words” and seemingly historical objects. On the contrary, Zhu believes that all 













implicit meaning of Confucius’s words.92 For Zhu, the recorded sentences by Confucius in the 
Analects are not mere moral instructions as how former interpreters have understood it but 
contain the truths about the world that Confucius tries to reveal. Perhaps it is exactly such an 
insight that had pushed Zhu to reorganise the Confucian canons and Zhu ended up putting 
forward the four books. What’s more, Zhu specifies and highlights the order (xu序) of reading 
the Confucian canons,93 with an implication that only after reading the Four Books is it more 
possible for one to understand Confucianism. As written in Zhuzi Yulei, “the four books are 
cooked rice, while other Confucian classics are rice grains which requires threshing (语孟中庸
大学是熟饭，看其它经，是打禾为饭).”94 According to Zhu’s view, the Analects, being a 
complete work itself and relatively easier to digest, is tightly associated with the other classics, 
playing a role of a foundation for understanding other classics.95  
 
Zhu Xi’s hermeneutics 
What is worth remarking about Zhu’s interpretation is that, although his work can be read 
as a completed work, Zhu himself acknowledges that there could still be possible errors to be 
fixed in his work:  
Having exerted a lifetime of effort on the Analects, Mencius, Daxue (Greater 
Learning), and Zhongyong (Mean), in a crude fashion, I had completed my 
explanation. Reading these recently, however, I found that there were still one or 













Sometimes, no matter where I turn, new problems arise. When seen in this light, my 
task is not an easy one.96 
 
Zhu’s acknowledgement may not affect how we assess his work of interpretation, but it surely 
arouses some concern which we should take into account while we evaluate his hermeneutics – 
regardless that most of Zhu’s Confucian successors as well as governments of East Asian states 
treat Zhu’s interpretation of Confucian classics as an orthodoxy, Zhu himself had been thinking 
and revising his interpretation until the end of his life. Hence, it seems that Zhu would not be 
happy to claim his final version of interpretation to be the only correct version. Rather, he might 
agree with the idea that one could always find problems in the last version of interpretation. 
Besides, Zhu himself has suggested a hermeneutical theory, though he does not claim it to be 
“his hermeneutics” but rather advocates it as a way of learning through reading. We shall discuss 
this way of reading here. 
 In Zhuzi Yulei, there are several chapters (e.g. Dushufa and Lunweixue are two chapters 
especially concentrate on reading Confucian classics in general) where Zhu discusses how 
learning should be done and how to read classics by sages. As introduced earlier, Zhu holds that 
Confucius, by uttering the sentences which are recorded in the Analects, reveals the truths about 
the world – Zhu uses the word Li to refer to those truths, attempting to draw a connection with 
the principle which can explain the reality of the external world and/or lead one to act morally 
(viz. we might take Li to be both the moral principle and the natural law here but it is 










speaking, carries (what Zhu thinks) the purest expressions of the Li that Confucius has. Then, in 
what way can one know the Li that are embedded in the Analects? For Zhu, everyone is endowed 
with Qi (in this case, Qi is usually explained to be some kind of energy inherent in a person),98 
and the only way to have knowledge about Li is to transform one’s Qi into which has the same 
quality as a sage’s Qi, because sages are born with the Qi which enables them to have direct 
contact with the Li.99 It is suggested in the chapter of Yu Meng Gangling: “If one reads through 
and become familiar with the text, one can be said to have engendered the [sages’] quality of Qi 
(如看得透，存养熟，可谓甚生气质).”100 To understand the quality of Qi, we can refer to what 
Zhu calls Qixiang101 in Lunyu Jizhu. Zhu mentions the word in the paragraph 5.25: “ whenever 
we look at the Analects, we must not only try to understand the textual content, but also learn to 
recognise the quality of Qi which is exclusive to sages (凡看论语，非但欲理会文字，须要识
得圣贤气象).”102 Having recognised a sage’s quality of Qi, one must try one’s best to transform 
one’s own quality of Qi to the same quality as the sage’s Qi. This should be the final aim of 





















 When Zhu talks about learning, he speaks in an almost imperative tone. Learning, to Zhu, 
means to comprehend Li, and the comprehension of Li is what all people should do in their life 
no matter if there has been written works existed by those sages who have comprehended Li. 
Reading, argued by Zhu, is a way (and probably the best way) most people could achieve 
learning, but is not necessary to learning. In Zhuzi Yulei, Zhu quotes “Zhaogong”: “learning is 
essentially not about reading, but if one does not read, it is very likely to be the case that one 
would not comprehend Li (学固不在乎读书，然不读书，则义理无由明).”103 The sages, 
according to Zhu, did not rely on reading to comprehend Li and there was no book for them to 
read; people of less intelligence, on the other hand, can only try to achieve learning by reading 
what the sages have written. With that claimed, Zhu adds that although the comprehended Li is 
embedded in the text and the aim of reading is clear for the readers – to transform the Qi, it is 
extremely hard for one to succeed in practise.104 Therefore, Zhu offers advice (primarily to his 
students) about how to read in order for a larger chance of success in learning. 
 Through the whole chapter of Dushufa, Zhu likes using the analogy of eating to discuss 
reading. Reading a text, according to Zhu, is like “eating a fruit (吃果子).”105 Therefore, the 
terms that Zhu uses in his suggested ways of reading are all related to “taste (味).” For example, 
he uses “flavour (滋味)” for referring to the feeling when one understands a text, and “playing 
with the savour of the text (玩味)” for referring to the process of ideal reading (understanding). 
The main idea is to argue for a feeling of intimate familiarity between a text reader and the 







intimate familiarity between the text reader and the Li expressed): “…after attaining refined 
intimacy the principles [Li] will be seen. It is like eating a piece of fruit: When you first bite it 
you have not yet experienced the flavour. So you eat it. [And in eating it,] you must chew till it is 
soft, for only then will the flavour naturally emerge. Only then will you be able to determine 
whether it is sweet or bitter; only then will you [start to] know the flavour (“…精熟后，理自见
得。如吃果子一般，劈头方咬开，未见滋味，便吃了。须是细嚼教烂，则滋味自出，方始
识得这个是甜是苦是甘是辛，始为知味)106.”107 Reading, then, must be a repeated work which 
enables the reader to get more and more familiar with the text, in order for building a more direct 
contact with Li. “If you just hold a piece of fruit in your hand, you do not know if its inside is 
acidic or salty, bitter or harsh (若只是握得一个鹘仑底果子，不知里面是酸，是咸，是苦，
是涩)108.”109 The text itself, the characters and words and sentences, are like how a piece of fruit 
looks like visually. It is only after one bites into the fruit and the flavour will be allowed to 
emerge. On the other hand, it is also the case that how the fruit looks like (those words and 
sentences) no longer plays an important role after one’s repeated chewing but only the flavour 
that one tastes matters. For the same reason, Zhu stresses three times in a row in Dushufa that 
one must avoid reading too much: “it is wrong to be “greedy” about the amount of reading (读书
不可贪多).”110 Only if one chews slowly and thoroughly can one swallow smoothly so that 
one’s body can absorb the nourishment. Only if one reads patiently and repeatedly can one build 









cause a higher chance of making mistakes and getting confused by the meanings understood 
from different texts. 
 As the reader “chews the fruit,” the reader is transferring the quality of her Qi closer to 
the sage’s (text author’s) quality of Qi. At the same time, the reader is able to “play with the 
savour of the text.” In Lunyu Jizhu, Zhu comments under the piece where Confucius answers the 







Someone said, “To employ virtue to repay resentment, how would that be?”  
The Master said, “What, then, would you employ to repay virtue? Employ 
straightforwardness to repay resentment; employ virtue to repay virtue.”112 For 
those who resent you, you should treat them according to how you feel – like or hate, 
accept or reject – and always be consistent [principled] and unbiased. This is what 
Confucius means by “straightforwardness.” For those who have done favour to you 
[who are virtuous], you should always employ virtue to repay them and never forget 
about what they have done. What the “someone” says could be called honest and 
sincere. Nevertheless, from a sage’s perspective, it is to realise that the person has 
done things intentionally so that, if you repay resentment with virtue, whatever you 
employ to repay the person who has done favour to you – virtue or resentment – will 
not balance your principle. Therefore, you must do according to what Confucius 
says, and your principle will be balanced. In such a case, there is no revenge for 
resentment, neither an absence of virtuous payback to virtue, and this case can still 
be called honest and sincere. The wording of this piece is simple, but the designated 
intention [meaning] is complex and zigzagging. The principle behind the meaning 
can be known with the same kind of easiness that characterises natural reproduction 
[viz. it could be known effortlessly], but [, although the knowing comes easily,] it is 
subtle and inexhaustible, and this is exactly why the learner [reader] should 










What is central to the idea of “play” is that the reader should participate in the meaning of the 
text and think. The more thoroughly one digests the classics, the more similarity between one’s 
thinking and a sage’s thinking because one’s Qi, as the energy for one’s thinking, is gradually 
transferring to sharing the quality with a sage’s Qi. It follows that the better one “plays with” the 
text, the more likely for one to comprehend Li – and thereby, become a sage. However, just like 
Confucius says, “Yóu114, there are few who recognize virtue115 (由！知德者鲜矣),116”117 Zhu 
believes that it is nearly impossible for one to become a sage like Confucius by learning (we may 
also deduce that from his assuming that all sages are born with the special Qi). In order to make 
one “plays with” the text better, Zhu argues for the attitude of “xuxin (虚心)” during one’s 
reading. 
 In Dushufa, Zhu uses the word “xuxin” for 22 times. For instance, “reading must be based 
on xuxin and self-experience (读书须是虚心切己);”118 “xuxin and then the way and Li will be 
clear (虚心则见道理明);”119 “the words of the sages must be read with xuxin. If you read it with 
preconception, then your understanding will be distorted (圣贤言语，当虚心看，不可先自立
说去撑拄，便喎斜了).”120 By “xuxin,” Zhu means the attitude one holds while reading with 
which one “read with an empty mind,”121 or with preconceived ideas removed122. The necessity 













classics will not lead the reader to Li unless the reader is born a sage. Hence, the reader’s 
prejudice and preconceptions will be an obstacle to understanding the meaning as well as the Li 
in a text. There might be two ways of interpreting Zhu’s argument for xuxin here: the first one 
suggests xuxin be taken as open-mindedness; and the second one suggests	a radical elimination 
of preconceptions (which is suggested by the literal meaning of xuxin: empty mind). Both 
Makeham and Tu tend to interpret xuxin in the first way. Makeham writes: “emptying one's mind 
is not simply a rejection of former interpretations so that one might passively reproduce some 
past meaning. Rather, it is an interim expedient by which one makes a conscious effort to divest 
oneself of received interpretations and ill-formulated subjective explanations.”123 Makeham’s 
explanation of xuxin seems to equate the idea with Gadamer’s “perception of completion.” 
According to Gadamer, one must assume the text to be an adequate, coherent, and truthful 
expression of a complete idea in order to understand the text. In this sense, Zhu would certainly 
agree with Gadamer since the classics, written by sages, must be such a completion. However, it 
might be reasonable to interpret Zhu’s idea about xuxin in a more radical way: xuxin implies a 
radical elimination of all preconceptions. This interpretation of xuxin could be drawn from Zhu’s 
idea of Qi transfer. According to Zhu’s idea, in order to comprehend Li, one’s Qi must share the 
same quality with a sage’s Qi. In the case of reading a classic, one must transfer one’s Qi totally 
to the Qi of the same quality as the author’s, which entails that one must abandon all of what 
would not be conceived by the author’s Qi but are conceived by one’s Qi before understanding 








If the original mind [of the reader without a complete Qi transfer] is submerged [by 
prejudices and false preconceptions] for long, and the meaning cannot be fully 
penetrated, it is suitable for the reader to read more books again and again and 
investigate Li. As the reader keeps doing that, the mind of desire will naturally be 
beaten, and the meaning will be secured and steady [then revealed] to the mind. 
 
The process of Qi transfer, then, is a process of wiping away all preconceptions that would not 
be held by a sage, namely those that stop one from comprehending Li. In other words, the 
comprehension of Li requires one to be a same person as a sage. Gadamer would probably assert 
Zhu’s idea of xuxin to be false if the idea is interpreted in the radical way, because, by arguing 
that, Zhu must also agree that one is able to transcend one’s pre-conceptions. As we have 
discussed, Gadamer regards himself to be standing against transcendental hermeneutic theory 
and he emphasises that some pre-conceptions are not escapable (which entails the finitude of 
historicity). Besides, Gadamer might also disagree with Qi transfer as the aim of understanding. 
This point shall be picked up later. 
 
Does Zhu Xi apply his own hermeneutics well? 
 Regardless which way we take to interpret Zhu Xi’s idea of xuxin, it is arguably 
suggested by Zhu’s hermeneutics that one must be open-minded to the text in order to possibly 
understand the text. With that claimed, Zhu thinks that understanding the classics even to only 
some extent is still a difficult job. In Dushufa, Zhu writes: “usually, if one does not understand 
after reading a text for ten times, then one reads it for twenty times; if twenty times still does not 
help, thirty to fifty times would allow the one to at least grow some insights. If one understands 




遍暝然不晓，便是气质不好)”125 As time goes on, it would be more and more difficult for the 
people of future generations to transfer their Qi when reading the classics, and Zhu takes it as his 
duty to reorganise as well as provide annotations for the classics so that it would be less difficult 
for people to understand those texts. 
 As discussed earlier, Zhu Xi, together with other Confucian scholars who advocates Li 
Xue, holds that the Confucian classics are receptacles of “the truth” (Li), and only when they are 
properly interpreted could Li be discovered. It became a mission for those scholars that they 
should create an order by which Li could be more easily revealed to the people who read the 
classics. A tendency towards creating an intellectual orthodoxy for Confucianism was formed at 
the time. According to Gardner, “in the Song period a movement to consolidate values, to return 
to a more narrowly and sharply articulated ‘orthodoxy,’ prevailed.”126 Although Zhu Xi might 
not treat his own interpretation as the only correct one, it might be doubtful whether Zhu would 
think that there could be other interpretations which do not follow his way. 
 The hallmark of Zhu Xi’s interpretation, as already suggested, focuses on how the 
sentences said by Confucius can reveal Li about the world. Even though the term Li itself has 
never appear in the Analects, there are 164 Li and 28 Tian Li (Li of the world) found in Zhu’s 
interpretation.127 Besides, it has been noticed by scholars in the Qing dynasty as well as recent 
scholars studying Zhu’s work that, even though Zhu cites many predecessor scholars’ 
interpretations of the Analects, he seems to have intentionally ignored many commonly accepted 









does not appear in the original text, which has in some sense created a gap between Zhu’s 
interpretation of the Analects and the Analects itself. We may look at some examples. 
 In the Analects 6.28, Confucius says: 
夫仁者，己欲立而立人，己欲达而达人…以己及人，仁者之心也。于此观之，
可以见天理之周流而无闲矣。129 
Those with Ren [usually translated as “benevolence”] establish others when they 
want to establish themselves, and they help others to achieve aims when they 
want to achieve their own aims…it is the heart/spirit of a Ren [benevolent] person 
to naturally put himself in the stance of others. It can be observed from this fact that 
the Li of the world flows around without obstruction. 
  
 We can see that, in the original text, there is nothing like the principle or law of nature 
mentioned by Confucius but only Ren. While in Zhu’s interpretation, the idea of Li is brought up 
and said to be related to Ren. Such phenomenon can be found in many other pieces of 
interpretation by Zhu such as: 
子使漆雕开仕。对曰：“吾斯之未能信”…斯，指此理而言…程子曰：“漆雕开
已见大意，故夫子说之。”130 
Confucius let Qi Diaokai [one of Confucius’ disciples] be the officer. Qi said: “I 
may not be trustworthy to be this” … This, here refers to this Li [of being an 
officer] … Cheng Zi [referring to Cheng Yi] said: “Qi Diaokai has already realised 
what Confucius mean [that Qi should be aware that his ability is inadequate for 
undertaking the duty], therefore Confucius is pleased.” 
 
 It might be hard to relate the “this” under such a context to the Li of something, and most 
interpretations just grant the “this” to refer to “being an officer.”131 However, Zhu Xi adds a 
quotation from Cheng Yi to back up his understanding. Gardner argues that Zhu imposes the idea 
of Li into the interpretation of Confucian classics because Zhu is attempting to give Confucian 







Xi with the interpretation by He Yan, concluding that He Yan, as a representative of pre-Zhu 
interpreters of the Analects, interprets the Analects as a guide for moral cultivations; while Zhu 
Xi builds up a metaphysical system for all those moral claims: “man could become perfectly 
moral because the nature with which he was born was itself always moral. But his natural 
endowment of psychophysical stuff (qi) could, if it were turbid, dense, or impure enough, 
obscure his moral nature, and thus it had to be refined if the moral nature was to become 
manifest.”132Through arguing for a principle of all things, Li, Zhu Xi gives a foundation of all 
Confucian teachings, including those related moral cultivation in the Analects. Such a 
metaphysical claim, if accepted, also strings all the Confucian classics more tightly into one 
system. Zhu’s school of Confucianism, promulgated in the Song, later became the dominant 
discourse as well as the state orthodoxy of post-Song China and some other East Asian states.133 
 If we recall Zhu’s hermeneutical view of understanding the classics, Zhu emphasises the 
ideas of tasting and of xuxin. Those two ideas in some sense mirrors Gadamer’s idea of 
participation with the text (or “fusing of horizons”) and of the perception of completion. From 
such a perspective, Zhu’s hermeneutics shares much similarity with Gadamerian hermeneutics, 
while due to the ambiguity of xuxin, it is difficult to judge whether Zhu agrees with Gadamer on 
how we should treat preconceptions in understanding. We will pick up this discussion in the final 
chapter. However, I shall argue here that Zhu Xi, in his interpretation of the Analects, contradicts 
his own hermeneutical view because his imposition of Li into the interpretation of the Analects 
violates both ideas of tasting and xuxin. 
 Based on the effort Zhu Xi spent on reading the Analects and researching about former 






previously prevalent interpretations and annotations which are inconsistent with his own 
understanding and even avoided discussing them in his work Lunyu Jizhu. Instead, Zhu has cited 
a large number of Li Xue scholars’ interpretations in order to serve as warrants for his 
metaphysical claims about the text’s content. As discussed, the idea of Li never appeared in the 
original text and many pieces of Zhu’s interpretation which focus on how Li can be revealed 
from Confucius’ words are, in some sense, forced. From what we have learned about the history 
of Confucianism in the Song, it may be suggested that Zhu Xi has injected his metaphysics into 
the interpretation primarily for the sake of constructing a systematic Confucian doctrine for his 
successor to follow, but such a decision could be criticised by Zhu’s own hermeneutics. 
 First, if one reads the Analects with Zhu Xi’s annotations, one can be easily affected by 
Zhu’s metaphysics which can be found throughout the text, and one is no longer “chewing” what 
the sage (Confucius) says but rather what Zhu Xi says. More ironically, unlike pre-Zhu 
interpretations which focus on “the superficial textual meaning” (criticised by Zhu Xi), the 
essence of Zhu’s annotations includes what cannot be found in the original text – Li. It looks 
more likely to be the case that Zhu no longer treats himself as a reader when writing his 
interpretation but as a sage recognised by his hermeneutical view – one who is born with the Qi 
to understand the Li embodied in the Analects.134 Hence, it might be fair to argue that Zhu’s 
Lunyu Jizhu actually blocks the readers from tasting the Analects. Second, not only has Zhu 
never really argued for his metaphysical claims about Confucius’ words, he intentionally ignored 
how former interpretations explain those words which had been commonly accepted and, to 
some extent, more straightforward in relation to the original text. It would be reasonable to 






assumption in interpreting the Analects uncritically. In this sense, Zhu Xi seems to be rejecting 






Post-Ming interpretations and the spirit of Kao Zheng 
 
 In this chapter, we will look at a few interpretations of the Analects by scholars in the 
modern era. By modern era, I refer to the time period from 17th century until today, and we will 
look at interpretations both by the Kao Zheng scholars135 in Qing dynasty (1636-1912) and 
western scholars who have translated the Analects. It must be clarified that even within these 
interpretations, there are huge diversities. I group these interpretations in one same chapter only 
in order to argue for a significant difference between Zhu Xi’s interpretation and those modern 
interpretations as a group, and I will argue that the modern interpretations all seem to share one 
common hermeneutical ground. Unlike Zhu who implicitly argues for his metaphysical theory 
through interpreting Confucius’ words, while presupposing his theory to be inherent in the 
Analects, the scholars we will be looking at in the following paragraphs take an “empirical” 
stance. By “empirical,” I mean a stance which stresses the importance of external evidence. 
Benjamin Elman articulates such a stance as “an epistemological position that stresses that valid 
knowledge must be corroborated by external (textual or otherwise) facts and impartial 
observation… [Scholars holding this position] searched for an external source for the 











The Kao Zheng trend in Qing dynasty 
 It is worth remarking that Zhu Xi’s theory was treated as the orthodox version of 
Confucianism, and the Confucian classics with Zhu’s interpretation were used in the civil service 
exam137 for governmental recruitment. Part of the reason for the Qing government’s adopting 
Zhu’s school of Confucianism, as argued by historians and scholars,138 is that: on the one hand, 
some Confucian ideas are beneficial to the government’s ruling of the state;139 on the other hand, 
Zhu’s Confucianism, being a school which advocates the idea of Li and differs from the 
Confucianism prevalent in the Ming140 (the dynasty taken over by the Qing) which advocates 
mind-heart introspection, is a more effective tool for constraining people’s thought and study by 
the government. If this is the case, it was only one tool used by the Qing dynasty to constrain 
thought. Another, more direct method, was literary inquisition and censorship, an approach 
which culminated in the eighteenth century Four Treasuries project.141 
Some scholars, being constrained by the literary inquisition in their own writings,142 tried 
























“evidential study had been thriving since the year of Qianlong. Those writings concerning the 
contemporary society by scholars are easy to be accused as anti-governmental. A lot of scholars 
then did not dare to write about the society and switched their research area to the study of 
classics and relics. Their achievements [in general] also surpassed their predecessors in former 
dynasties (乾隆以来多朴学，知人论世之文，易触时忌，一概不敢从事，移其心力，毕注
於经学，毕注於名物训诂之考订，所成就亦超出前儒之上).”143 Xiao Yishan also argues: 
“Those scholars who had thoughts about their nation [the Han], under the force by an alien 
government [the Qing government by Manchu], were unwilling to be yes-men of the government 
but also too cowardly to launch radical revolutions. They wanted to study freely but were afraid 
of the persecution. What can they do? All they could choose was ‘keeping their nose clean’ and 
‘making friends with the ancients’, which was to study the ancient texts (有民族思想的学者，
在异族的钤制政策下，不甘心作无耻的应声虫，又不敢作激烈的革命党，自由研究学问，
也怕横撄文网，那还有甚么办法？只好'明哲保身'，'尚友古人'，向故纸堆里去钻了).”144 
Western scholars who study the Qing history such as Benjamin Elman and John Henderson share 
the same opinion on the cause of the rise of evidential research, while Henderson points out that 
the Kao Zheng scholars also had concerns for practical problems in science within their textual 
interests.145 To the government and the Emperor (such as Qianlong), evidential research into the 
most important writings of the Chinese tradition did no harm to their ruling of the state and 








no words written by a scholar that described the Manchu court or Mongols disrespectfully, the 
scholar could study as well as write about any aspect of the classics that he found interesting.146  
Although the thriving of Kao Zheng might suggest that those scholars chose to do 
empirical studies mainly because they were, to some extent, forced to, they ended up producing 
scrupulous works of exegeses and interpretations of the classics based on empirical research. 
Unlike Zhu Xi, who injected his own ideas into the interpretation of the Confucian classics, the 
purpose of interpreting the classics for the Kao Zheng scholars was relatively simple: to retrieve 
the original meaning of the classics through searching for evidence. Elman treats the Kao Zheng 
scholars as philologists who “favoured linguistic clarity, simplicity, and purity… hoped to 
eliminate linguistic confusion and thereby locate a bedrock of timeless order… from ancient 
artefacts and historical documents and text… personal achievement of sagehood, by now an 
unrealistic aim for serious Confucians, was no longer their goal.”147 Such a historical condition 
might make us think, in our analysis of the interpretations by those Qing scholars, about how the 
interpreter views Zhu Xi’s hermeneutics as well as make comparison between the interpreter’s 
hermeneutics with Zhu’s.   
 Among the large number of Qing scholars who devoted their academic life in evidential 
research, I focus on three scholars who, according to my view, were responsible for the most 
typical interpretations of the Kao Zheng tradition: Mao Qiling, Gu Yanwu, and Liu Baonan. 
Although there are significant diversities among these Kao Zheng scholars, all of the Kao Zheng 
scholars base their interpretations on meticulous empirical research, as described by Liang 






truth from facts’ and ‘believing nothing without evidence’ (其治学之根本方法，在‘实事求
是’，‘无证不信’).”148 We shall will look at the three scholars one by one. 
 The first Kao Zheng scholar we will look at is Mao Qiling (1623-1716). Mao did not 
begin the work of interpreting the Analects until his later life after he retired from his work in the 
government, and his main contribution to Analects interpretation, Lunyu Jiqiu Pian, was inspired 
by his disagreement with Zhu Xi’s interpretation. In the preface of the book, Mao writes: “When 
I read the Analects at early age, I was excited and inspired. However, when I read it the second 
time, I started to be sceptical about it… after I read it repeatedly, more and more suspicion 
emerged. It seems to be the case that what Confucius meant by his words was not as how the 
seventy students of Confucius’ interpreted them. The meaning explicated by the interpretation 
was imposed by the interpreters… those interpretations are books by the Confucian scholars in 
the Song but not books by Confucius (少读论语, 激欢然, 至再读而反疑之…再三读而犹豫烦
生, 似宣尼所吕与七十子之所编记其思旨本不如是而斛者以己意强行之… 此宋儒之书非夫
子之书也).”149 He further criticises Zhu Xi’s interpretation by claiming that Zhu only refers to 
some of He Yan’s150 interpretation of the Analects while those parts of He Yan’s interpretation 
are basically Daoist readings. Thereby, Mao states that his aim in editing his interpretation is to 
reveal what Confucius really meant by his words recorded in the Analects based on evidential 
research and to point out Zhu’s mistakes: “Zhu’s Jizhu, as an interpretation of the textual 











evidential research. I have studied much and I like arguing, therefore I would like to draw 
references from the ancient texts and challenge Zhu(朱子集注研究丈义期于惟理, 而此原不以
考注为长. 奇龄学博而好辨, 遂旁采古义以相诰难).”151 
 In Lunyu Jiqiu Pian, Mao selects 91 pieces from the Analects that he argues had been 
misinterpreted by Zhu. For each of them, Mao refers to multiple sources in ancient times 
(especially from the pre-Qin period), including the other pieces in the same text, former scholars’ 
interpretations, and ancient didactics, in order to find the “most possible meaning” of the text.152 
Besides, Mao also cares much about the accuracy of historical facts that are mentioned in the 
text. For example, in his interpretation of the chapter about “Duke Huan kills Jiu(桓公杀公子
纠),” Mao tries to figure out who is the older brother between Jiu and Bai.153 For this purpose, he 
refers to classics such as Gongyang and Lianggu and historical records such as Shiji. Holding 
references from multiple reliable sources, Mao makes criticism of Zhu Xi’s interpretation in 
terms of sentence meaning, character identification, and appellations.154 
 After most of his interpretations of a piece, Mao writes a concluding paragraph in which 
he expresses his own opinion on how a reader should approach the discussed piece and why 
some former interpretations of the same piece are mistaken. Every claim he makes about how 
one should interpret the Analects is backed up by multiple sources – often being drawn from 













hermeneutics: first, Mao deserves the name of “a pioneer” who challenges the orthodoxy (Zhu’s 
Confucianism) at his time in a way that was accepted by his society and highly appreciated by 
other scholars – through looking for evidence from the ancient time for the text; second, it is fair 
to claim that, according to Mao’s hermeneutical view, figuring out what the sentences in a text 
correspond to at the time when those sentence were written, even if it is not necessarily the only 
aim, should be the foremost aim of the interpretation. I shall argue that the second view is shared 
by all the interpreters discussed in this chapter, and we will further examine this view later. 
 The second interpreter, Gu Yanwu (1613-1682), was born in the last few years of the 
Ming dynasty and grew up in a state governed by the Qing government. In his early life, Gu 
joined anti-Qing movements, all of which failed to overthrow the new government. After that, he 
travelled around without yielding to the Qing government and became a geographer and 
philologist. Although Gu does not have a specific work on the Analects like Mao Qiling’s Lunyu 
Jiqiu Pian, the Analects often appears in his main works. For example, one of the most well-
known of Gu’s works, Ri Zhi Lu, took its name from the Analects: “knowing what one has yet to 
understand everyday, and, month by month, not forgetting what one has learned can be called 
one who loves learning (日知其所亡，月无忘其所能，可谓好学也已矣).”156 In terms of 
learning, Gu argues against the over-emphasis on what is non-practical such as Li, but advocates 
self-cultivation through learning from classic texts and external things. According to his view, 
the reason why Ming was overthrown was the corruption of (Confucian) scholars, and the reason 
for the corruption was that Ming scholars all ignored the importance of applying what they 
learned from the classics to real life and they lived dissolutely. In order to correct and remould 





broadly learn from Wen157 and conduct oneself with a sense of shame (博学于文， 行己有
耻).”158 In fact, the whole sentence in this claim is made up of quotes from the Analects.159 
 If we take Ri Zhi Lu as an example, there is no comprehensive interpretation of any large 
piece from the Analects. Instead, we can find scattered interpretations as well as analyses of short 
pieces from the Analects all over the whole work. As introduced, Gu holds that the Ming 
perished because the scholars and officers in the Ming all advocated that which was non-
practical and believed that they were pursuing what was beyond moral codes in real life. Gu 
argues that the ideas advocated by scholars in the Song and the Ming all separated what people 
ought to do in daily life from what they believed as the ultimate principle (e.g. Li for Zhu Xi). In 
book seven of Ri Zhi Lu, Gu writes: “[in the Analects] Sima Niu asks Confucius about Ren. 
Confucius says that one who has Ren must be one who is cautious about the words one 
speaks…people today do not attain the level of Sima Niu, but they are so arrogant that they try to 
make claims which are even beyond what is said by Confucius’ two favourite disciples. 
Eventually, those people talk about Xing and Tiandao [viz. those ultimate principles] without 
realising that they have fallen into something like Chan Buddhism (司马牛问仁子曰: 仁者,其言
也訒…今之君子学未及乎司马牛, 而欲其说之高于顔曽二子, 是以终日言性与天道而不自知
其堕于禅学也).”160 According to Gu, even if there is some kind of ultimate principles, those 
principles must be internal to good characters and right actions in daily life. If one claims the 









one is likely to fall into Chan Buddhism (which is negatively viewed by Confucians). Thus, the 
assumption that Confucius’ words must carry some kind of ultimate principles beyond daily 
moral codes is unjustified and pointless. Gu then argues that, in order to understand what the text 
really means, one ought to look for references drawn from works which share close relationships 
with Confucius himself. 
 In Gu’s own interpretation of the Analects, he usually draws evidence from the other 
Confucian classics. Sometimes the evidence for the same piece is inconsistent. In such cases, Gu 
does not forcibly make conclusions about what the piece means, but rather present all the 
reasonable evidences. In book seven where he tries to interpret “Wen (文)” in the sentence “one 
should eruditely learn from Wen (博学于文),” he presents how the term is explained in Li Ji, 
Zhou Yi, Yi Zhou Shu, and elsewhere in the Analects, without concluding about how the term 
should be understood in the sentence.161 However, such presentation is not a simple list of 
sentences which seem related to the term. Gu presents them for two purposes: first, to challenge 
the commonly accepted interpretation by earlier scholars; second, to provide as many reasonable 
approaches as possible to understanding the term. Because of such a hermeneutical stance, Gu is 
often viewed by today’s scholars as the pioneer of evidential research trends in the Qing 
dynasty.162  
 The third interpreter we will look at from the group of Qing Kao Zheng scholars is Liu 
Baonan. Liu has left a work even larger in content than Zhu Xi’s Lunyu Jizhu, in which Liu 
integrates all the former interpretations of and companions to the Analects that he regards as 






 Liu Baonan was a person who loved travel and making friends with other scholars. It is 
thought to be the case by many scholars who study his work that Liu wrote Lunyu Zhengyi 
primarily for the purpose of arguing with his friends on the interpretation of the Analects. While 
it is also suggested by scholars that the last seven chapters were in fact not written by Liu 
Baonan but by his second son Liu Gongmian.163 Different from the other two interpretations we 
just discussed, which criticise the orthodoxy by Zhu Xi, Lunyu Zhengyi holds a neutral attitude 
towards Zhu’s interpretation. For Liu Baonan (and Liu Gongmian), every former interpretation 
or annotation has parts which are worth regarding and parts which should be rejected. For each 
piece from the Analects, Liu puts all the interpretations made by former interpreters he regards as 
reasonable from his research with a beginning of “A says” and “B says” etc. After these 
interpretations, Liu writes his own idea about how to interpret the piece with a beginning of 
“Zhengyi says.”164 Through the whole work, Liu cites more than 150 works including former 
interpretations, classics, historical records, and works about characters. Zhu Xi’s interpretation is 
also part of which Liu puts in his work, but Liu, like other Qing scholars, tends to reject Zhu’s 
idea of Li and only retain those pieces about textual explanation. However, Liu does not reject all 
claims about what Confucius tries to express besides the superficial textual meaning. What Liu, 
as well as other Kao Zheng scholars, rejects is claims made without a solid basis of good 
evidences. For example, claims made by Kao Zheng scholars Dai Zhen and Jiao Xun are of 
extended explications beyond the superficial textual meaning, but those claims are backed up by 








 Liu Baonan shares a similar hermeneutical view with Mao Qiling and Gu Yanwu that the 
interpretation of the Analects should rely not on introspection but on evidence related to the text. 
Their shared view indicates that Qing scholars were suspicious about Zhu Xi’s interpretation of 
the Analects. Liu, however, does not intentionally criticise Zhu Xi’s interpretation simply 
because of Zhu’s over-simplistic evidence for making conclusive claims in the interpretation. 
Rather, Liu inspects Zhu’s interpretation with empirical research and then judges whether the 
interpretation is reasonable or not based on evidence from the research.166 After all, arguing for 
one or some interpretations over others is not the primary aim held by the Kao Zheng scholars. 
When they are gathering more evidence in their empirical research, as they believe from their 
hermeneutical stance, they are making more impartial observations as well as stepping closer to 
the original meaning of the text. When they write down their interpretations of the Analects, 
instead of arguing for the adequacy of their explanation, what they care most about is that they 
present the meaning (in some sense as or close to a retrieval of Confucius’ intention) of the 
Analects as accurate and straightforward as possible to the readers. 
 
Translations as interpretations based on empirical research 
The hermeneutical view held by Qing scholars can often be found in the English 
translations of the Analects by Western scholars. Generally speaking, the study of Chinese 
culture and language by non-Chinese scholars must require empirical research and 
communication. This holds true for both early Western missionaries who arrived in China and 
more recent scholars who study Chinese texts in academic institutions. One of the many English 





translator in his book The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation. Ames writes that 
the difference between two languages marks the difference between two groups of discourses 
“about the world, about beliefs, and about attitudes.”167 According to Ames, one must be aware 
that, although making “cultural generalisations” can be problematic, it is more dangerous if we 
do not do so and fall into a position168 in which we do not identify or elaborate the 
presuppositions underlying all discourse sedimented into a language. A translator of the 
Analects, then, must first attempt to identify and elaborate so as to “describe the world as 
experienced by the ancient Chinese who walk through its [the book’s] pages.”169 From such a 
claim about translation and translator, it is suggested that, since the translator must identify and 
elaborate the presupposition held by the text author in the author’s use of language, the translator 
must first have knowledge about the language used for the text before diving into the 
interpretation of the text itself. In the rest of the chapter, I will bring popular English translations 
of the Analects for analysis, which provide not only the translated text from the original book, 
but also a large number of annotations included by the translator that come from their own 
empirical research. The translations of the Analects, primarily as a type of interpretation, are also 
typical examples sharing the similar hermeneutical view we aim to evaluate in this chapter. 
We shall first look at Ames’ translation. Ames is concerned with the relation between 
metaphysics and language when he talks about translation. As mentioned earlier, he regards it to 
be helpful that a translator makes some generalisations about a culture/language so that the 
translator may do better in presenting the text in a sense closer to that in the original language. 








what a translator should be aware of when translating a text from classical Chinese into English. 
For example, he makes the point that classical Chinese is more “an eventful language”170 than 
English and other Indo-European language which are more “substantive.”171 Ames uses the 
example of a tree to demonstrate the difference: a tree in English is described as a substance 
which is real and exists by its own; in classical Chinese, a tree is described relationally and 
eventfully – e.g. a tree is described with some kind of relation to seasons, to natural phenomena, 
or to the one who sees it is seen at some time.172 There are also no clear distinctions between 
nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs. He further explains that, when we talk about the relations 
between two things (in English, it would be two substances described by nouns), the relatedness 
can be described “extrinsically.”173 It may remind us of the “extensionality” we talk about in 
philosophy of mind and language, by which we say that a relation can be described in the form 
of “aRb,” where the relatedness R holds regardless of how we describe a and b. In classical 
Chinese, however, “correlation” might be a more felicitous term. Nothing from a sentence can be 
individually defined, and Ames suggest that the reason for it has to do with the metaphysics in 
ancient China. In the metaphysics underlying classical Chinese, the totality of all things (万物) is 
inhered by both change (变) and persistence (通).174 While many Western thinkers often tie 
“what is real” to “what does not change,” the ancient Chinese thinkers do not think in this way. 
Such a difference between the two target languages certainly brings much challenge to the 









It is easily observable in Ames’ translation that he tries very hard to convert the language 
in the classical Chinese text into a way which might be understandable in English while 
retaining, as much as he can, the original style/form of the text. Take the passage 12.11 in his 
translation as example, in which four phrases are mentioned: “君君，臣臣，父父，子子.”175 
Each of these four phrases consists of two same characters. Grammatically, the former character 
serves as the subject noun and the latter one as the verb. How the verb should be interpreted is 
related to the subject noun. Ames suggests in his analysis of the four phrases that an English 
speaker may read the first two phrases as “the ruler should rule, minister should minister,” but 
the third phrase might be read as “father should sire” because “father” is not strictly used as a 
verb meaning “to act as a father” in English. However, in the actual translation of this piece, 
Ames keeps the form of the original text and writes the third phrase as “father should father.”176 
To some extent, it might still be understandable directly by an English speaker although the 
phrase/sentence would be grammatically mistaken. What is important here is that Ames 
intentionally retains the form of the original text while giving clarification elsewhere, such as 
footnotes and appendixes, ensuring that the readers do not simply read his analyses but also a 
text as close as possible to the original text. In fact, Ames even keeps the actual text in classical 
Chinese in his book. 
I suggest that Ames’ hermeneutical view of translation is not only shared by typical Kao 
Zheng scholars, but also by many popular versions of the Analects in English such as Edward 
Slingerland’s and the online translation by Robert Eno. Slingerland and Eno, unlike Ames, have 






Chinese scholars we have discussed – Zhu Xi and Kao Zheng scholars – which is to put 
annotations and analyses below or on the side of the actual text. If we look at the same piece 
discussed in Ames’ translation, it is observed that both Slingerland’s and Eno’s work include 
their empirical research about when and where this sentence was uttered by Confucius – 
Confucius said it in 516 B.C. in Qi to Duke Jing, and both works indicate that the paragraph 
12.11 is suggested by many former scholars to be concerned with what Confucius talks about in 
13.3.177 Being richer in content than Eno’s online publication, Slingerland also includes 
historical information about how people usually treat words like ruler/lord (君), minister (臣), 
father (父), and son (子), as well as citing Zhu Xi’s comments.178 However, in the actual 
translation of the text, Slingerland and Eno seem to be less concerned about the form/style than 
Ames. The four phrases in Slingerland’s translation are written as “the lord be a true lord, the 
ministers true ministers, the fathers true fathers, and the sons true sons.”179 Eno translates: “the 
ruler be ruler, ministers ministers, fathers fathers, sons sons.”180 We might treat such translations 
as more English-speaker-friendly translations because they are phrased in more common ways 
than how Ames writes. However, such translations may keep the readers who only speak English 
but not Chinese more distant from the actual Analects. 
At first glance, the aim of interpretation claimed by the post-Ming interpretations – an 
intention to retrieve the author’s intention – sounds like what would be criticised by Gadamerian 











the understanding process. Nevertheless, the methodology of empirical research that those 
interpreters apply shall distinguish their hermeneutical view with which Hirsch might hold. The 
reason why post-Ming interpreters choose to do empirical research is that they have realised the 
difference between Confucius’ cultural history and their own ones, meanwhile the methodology 
of comparing multiple former interpretations shall imply that their understanding process is 
fundamentally dialectical. In other words, the spirit of Kao Zheng in understanding – “seeking 
truth from facts (实事求是)” and “believing nothing without evidence (无证不信)” – is the spirit 
of being critical of one’s own cultural history. Hence, I shall argue that the post-Ming 
interpreters are by no means committed to any hermeneutical view which presupposes the pre-
existence of the meaning of the text, and their caution during the interpreting process implies 
their will to participate in the dialectical fusing with the text as well as their will to think about 








 We have discussed that an evaluation under the light of Gadamerian hermeneutics 
emphasises that an interpretation should be treated as a creation, presenting the meaning of a text 
forged from a dialectical fusing between the interpreter and the text. The meaning should make 
sense of the text for, make the text coherent with, and bring meaningfulness to the interpreter and 
those who share their cultural history with the interpreter.181 Because the meaning of a text does 
not exist independently of any cultural history, the evaluation of any interpretation must also be 
made from a stance which more or less share its cultural history with the interpreter’s in order to 
make the evaluation legit to certain extent. Therefore, for the investigation of both groups of 
interpretations of the Analects, we first looked at the historical condition behind those 
interpreters’ understanding so as to commensurate their cultural histories as much as we could 
with ours, and to be familiar with their use of languages as well as their forms/styles of 
interpretation. Only on such a basis could we make legit evaluations of their interpretations and 
their hermeneutical views. 
 In the beginning paragraph of chapter 5, I mentioned briefly why I distinguish the 
interpretations into two groups, which has to do with two different hermeneutical approaches – 
Zhu Xi’s interpretation aims at the implicit advocation of his metaphysics through interpreting a 
Confucian classic, meanwhile the post-Ming interpretations aim at retrieving the original 
intention of Confucius as accurately as they can. With that claimed, I do not intend to argue for a 
clear distinction between the two trends, but for a difference of emphasis. It can be observed that 





the Analects from the large number of quotations he made in Lunyu Jizhu. It can also be 
observed that the post-Ming interpreters made conclusive claims of the text’s content (in the case 
of translations, every translated sentence should be regarded as a conclusive claim of the text’s 
content, a re-expression of what the translator believes to be Confucius’ intention). However, as 
suggested in chapter 4, Zhu Xi seems to have purposefully filtrated his researching results in 
order to fully support his metaphysical claims. On the contrary, post-Ming interpreters tend not 
to forcibly make conclusive claims which are not well warranted by what they have researched. 
In this chapter, we shall discuss how these two trends of interpretations of the Analects can be 
assessed by Gadamerian hermeneutics, and we will focus on three questions as standards: 1) 
does the interpretation leave it open for future interpretations following the same fusing of 
horizons (viz. is there space for someone who shares the same cultural history with the 
interpreter to continue the interpreting process)? 2) What prejudgements does the interpreter hold 
to approach the meaning of the Analects? 3) What can one learn from the interpretation which 
cannot be acquired from simply reading the Analects itself? 
 From Zhu Xi’s hermeneutical view that we discussed in chapter 4, it is arguable that 
Zhu’s anti-completion view of interpretation182 leaves the understanding process open-ended 
since “no matter where I turn, new problems arise.”183 Zhu has always regarded his interpretative 
work as a companion for future learners to approach the classics written by the ancient sage. 
Having provided both a work of interpretation (Lunyu Jizhu) and a work which teaches people 
how to interpret (Zhuzi Yulei), Zhu is much concerned with how successfully his followers 







and his belief that only sages are born with the quality of acquiring Li that, although 
understanding as a process is endless for Zhu, the process is not historically based. This has to do 
with Zhu’s emphasis on metaphysics and his prejudgement that all classics written by the sages 
are embodiments of Li. Li – as the ultimate principle – must be history-free, and one must empty 
one’s prejudgements which are based on their cultural history (transform one’s quality of Qi into 
which is suitable for reading the classics) in order to enter the understanding process. Zhu not 
only advocates such a reading of the classics in his hermeneutical theory but even rejects other 
ways of reading the classics, suggested by his interpretation of the Analects. Having been caged 
by his metaphysical presupposition, Zhu grants those former interpretations of the Analects 
which are incompatible with his metaphysics to be wrong and therefore only cites sources which 
are compatible. It has been argued that Zhu’s metaphysics, together with ideas like Li, does not 
straightforwardly come from the original work of Confucius. Perhaps just as how Mao Qiling 
argues, Zhu’s interpretation would take readers even more distant from the original classics. In 
this case, Zhu’s prejudgement, which has provided a foothold for him to interpret the Analects, 
might have also been a hinderance to the fusing of horizons, because Zhu has been caged by his 
metaphysics and he (maybe purposefully) refuses to be critical of it.  
But precisely because Zhu presupposes his metaphysics throughout the understanding 
process, his interpretation has played such an important role in the history of Confucianism. 
Zhu’s doctrine was officialised to be the Confucian orthodoxy by many post-Song states because 
the Confucian classics under his interpretation had been much more systematically organised. 
With Zhu’s annotations, readers are more likely to approach the obscure sentences in the original 
work. Besides, just because Zhu himself does not take a critical stance towards his metaphysical 
prejudgements, it does not follow that somebody who begins her understanding process with 
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Zhu’s metaphysics cannot be critical of those prejudgements. As suggested by Gadamerian 
hermeneutics, one can only be critical of one’s tradition by a deeper understanding of it. There 
have been Confucian scholars who read the Analects with Zhu’s commentaries, and many of 
them (e.g. Qing scholars such as Mao Qiling and Liu Baonan) were eventually able to be critical 
of the metaphysical presuppositions and chose to criticise the adequacy of those presuppositions. 
 As for the post-Ming interpreters that we have discussed, although they seem to claim 
that what they try to do in the interpretations is to retrieve Confucius’ original intention, it might 
be unfair to accuse them of asserting the author’s intention to be the end of interpretation.184 It 
has been argued that the spirit of Kao Zheng (or empirical research) is the spirit of being critical 
of one’s own cultural history: because one’s cultural history might mislead one from 
understanding the text well, one ought to look for external evidence in order to verify or falsify 
one’s prejudgement about the text. Due to the historical and cultural gap between the Analects 
and themselves, these post-Ming interpreters tend to feel suspicious about their own 
prejudgements of the original text. Therefore, they turned to the searching for evidence. It is also 
inadequate to accuse them of not understanding the text, or of merely gathering information. 
Instead of having no prejudgement, it is more proper to describe them as being cautious of 
holding any prejudgement of the text. Those prejudgements include not only which held by 
themselves, but also which held by other interpreters. We have seen that Qing scholars are 
concerned about historical facts and translators tend to make some kind of “cultural 
generalisation” about a language, both of which demonstrate their caution about making 






“believing nothing without evidence (无证不信)”185 do not imply that these interpreters rarely 
have their own interpretations. On the contrary, these interpreters try to provide people with the 
most warranted interpretation, warranted not (only) by introspection from one particular cultural 
history but by evidence from empirical research and reasonable inferences.  
 According to Gadamerian hermeneutics, understanding is only possible if it is a process 
beginning with some kind of pre-conception given by a cultural history, and a good 
understanding process must be dialectical, meaning that the interpreter should constantly be 
conscious of her prejudgements and be critical of them. Both trends of interpretations of the 
Analects we have discussed in this thesis have demonstrated what Gadamerian hermeneutics 
claims to necessarily happen in any understanding process. Meanwhile, by criticising Zhu Xi’s 
understanding process of being caged by certain prejudgements, it is reemphasised that a good 
understanding should be a dialectical process. Otherwise, the foothold of understanding may 
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